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BRUCE MILLER* 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2009, the Obama administration announced a plan 
to issue an executive order authorizing the indefinite detention 
without trial of non-citizens suspected of terrorism.1  This proposal 
followed and expanded on the President’s May 21, 2009 speech, de­
livered at the National Archives, in which he argued that protecting 
national security required a non-criminal detention system for per­
sons who cannot be successfully prosecuted but are, in the view of 
the Executive Branch, too dangerous to release.2  The Administra­
* Professor of law, Western New England University School of Law; AB, Stan­
ford University; JD, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to Thomas DeBose, J.D. West­
ern New England University School of Law, 2010 and member of the Massachusetts 
Bar, for his exceptional research and editorial help and, even more, for his insights into 
the difficult questions raised by our nation’s anti-terrorism detention policies. The ar­
gument made in this piece owes much to Mr. DeBose’s clear thinking and balanced 
judgment.  Thanks also to the Editorial Board and staff of the Western New England 
Law Review for consistently helpful comments, questions, and suggestions and for un­
erring technical support. 
1. Dafna Linzer & Peter Finn, White House Weighs Order on Detention, WASH. 
POST, June 27, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/26/ 
AR2009062603361.html. 
2. President Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the Pres­
ident on National Security at the National Archives (May 21, 2009), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National­
Security-5-21-09/; see Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Would Move Some Detainees to 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/us/politics/ 
22obama.html. 
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tion’s plan appeared to be based on the same broad and controver­
sial claims of Presidential power asserted by Mr. Obama’s 
predecessor, George W. Bush.  The President’s announcement in­
cluded few details.  It failed to define the classes of persons subject 
to detention or to specify the institutions, civilian or military, execu­
tive or judicial, that would be authorized to order a detention.  Nor 
did the proposal address the evidence needed to justify particular 
detentions, the rights of potential detainees to see and challenge 
such evidence—especially if it has been classified, or the extent to 
which detention proceedings would be public. Then, on July 21, a 
task force appointed by the President to make recommendations 
regarding the fates of prisoners held at the U.S. Naval base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba issued an interim report recommending 
continued indefinite detention of some of these prisoners, but also 
the establishment of a “durable and effective” framework for hold­
ing future detainees captured in the fight against terrorists.3 
The President’s task force elaborated on this recommendation 
on January 22, 2010, when it issued its final, case-by-case, review of 
the status of the then approximately 240 prisoners remaining in mil­
itary detention at Guantanamo.4  The review concluded that these 
detainees should be divided into three groups.  About thirty-five 
prisoners would be prosecuted for alleged crimes, leaving the ques­
tion of whether the venue for these prosecutions should be civilian 
or military courts unresolved.5  Another one hundred and ten pris­
oners would be entitled to release, some as soon as possible, and 
others eventually, on the ground that there was no lawful basis for 
the United States military to continue detaining them.6  Thirty 
members of this second group, however, were Yemeni nationals, 
and the Obama Administration had barred the repatriation of any 
detainees to Yemen.7  The Administration imposed this prohibition 
because of its belief that an apparent attempt by a young Nigerian 
3. Glen Greenwald, First Steps Taken to Implement Preventive Detention, Military 
Commissions, SALON.COM (July 21, 2009) http://salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/07/ 
21/detention/. 
4. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 
1, 7-8 (2009) [hereinafter FINAL  REPORT], available at http://media.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/GTMOtaskforcereport_052810.pdf; see also Charlie Savage, De­
tainees Will Still Be Held, But Not Tried, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22gitmo.html. 
5. Peter Finn, Justice Task Force Recommends About 50 Guantanamo Detainees 
Be Held Indefinitely, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp­
dyn/content/article/2010/01/21/AR2010012104936_pf.html. 
6. Id.; Savage, supra note 4. R 
7. Finn, supra note 5. R 
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man to blow up a civilian airliner landing in Detroit on Christmas 
Day in 2009 was the fruit of a plot that originated in Yemen.8 
The third category of military prisoners held at Guantanamo, 
numbering about fifty, constituted of men who were, the review 
concluded, subject to indefinite detention “without trial under the 
laws of war.”9  Obama administration officials acknowledged that 
these prisoners were entitled to use the privilege of habeas corpus 
to challenge their incarceration in federal court, but did not other­
wise recommend specific standards or procedures to govern the ad­
judication of these challenges.10 
On the same day that the President’s Task Force released its 
final report, three United States District Court judges assigned 
habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of Guantanamo detainees 
expressed a good deal of confusion and consternation about how 
these petitions should proceed.  One of them, Chief Judge Royce 
Lamberth, emphasized both the high stakes at issue in these cases 
and his marked frustration about the absence of any clarity about 
how to go about resolving them: “[We] are struggling ‘to adapt legal 
principles to a whole new sphere of human existence that we’ve 
never witnessed in history as far as I know.’”11 
Chief Judge Lamberth, along with Judges Reggie Walton and 
Ricardo Urbina, described the problems they faced as stemming 
from a “battle against terrorist groups [that] doesn’t fit the classic 
definition of war, with clearly defined enemies who would be re­
leased when the conflict was settled.”12  As captives held in a war 
“without end, terroris[t] detainees,” the Judges pointed out, “could 
be locked up for life.”13  At the same time, they emphasized, “the 
risk in ordering a detainee to be released seems much greater than 
in past conflicts, because a return to the battlefield is not just a re­
turn to traditional frontlines, but to possible attacks on civilians.”14 
“‘How confident can I be,’” Chief Judge Lamberth lamented, strik­
ing a tone as understandable as it may be apocalyptic, “‘that if I 
8. Id.; Savage, supra note 4. R 
9. Finn, supra note 5. R 
10. Id. 
11. Chisun Lee, Judges Urge Congress to Act on Indefinite Terrorism Detentions, 
ON THE  HILL  BLOG (Jan. 22, 2010), http://onthehillblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/judges­
urge-congress-to-act-on.html (quoting Chief Judge Royce Lamberth). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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make the wrong choice that he won’t be the one that blows up the 
Washington Monument or the Capitol?’”15 
A Brookings Institution report,16 also issued on January 22, 
evinced a good deal of sympathy for the situation facing the Guan­
tanamo habeas corpus judges.17  The Report, co-authored by 
Brookings Fellows Benjamin Wittes and Rabea Benhalim, and Uni­
versity of Texas Law Professor Robert M. Chesney, lamented the 
absence of any helpful sources of law defining (or limiting) the 
President’s military detention authority or establishing procedures 
applicable in federal court to such detention.18  As a consequence, 
according to these scholars, the judges’ dispositions of these chal­
lenges have produced an array of incompatible approaches to these 
important questions.19 
As the Justice Department, federal judges, and thoughtful aca­
demic commentators underscored the continuing uncertainty sur­
rounding the legal status and rights of persons apprehended in the 
United States’ efforts to combat terrorism, other events during the 
winter and spring of 2009-2010 illustrated some of the practical ef­
fects of this uncertainty.  The decision of the Obama Administra­
tion to prosecute the alleged Christmas Day airplane bomber 
criminally rather than to remand him to military custody was se­
verely criticized by proponents of military detention. Senators Jo­
seph Lieberman and Susan Collins claimed that treating this 
suspect “as a criminal rather than [as] a UEB [Unprivileged Enemy 
Belligerent] almost certainly prevented the military . . . from ob­
taining information that would have been critical . . . to preventing 
future attacks.”20  Senator Collins added that in her view the Con­
stitution offered no protection to the alleged bomber because he 
was not a U.S. citizen and had no previous connection with the 
15. Id. (quoting Chief Judge Royce Lamberth). 
16. BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, THE EMERGING 
LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2010), avail­
able at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_ 
wittes_chesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf. 
17. See Lyle Denniston, Commentary: A GTMO Anniversary, and a New Debate, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/commentary-a­
gtmo-anniversary-and-a-new-debate/. 
18. Id.; see also WITTES ET AL., supra note 16, at 1-3. R 
19. Denniston, supra note 17; see also WITTES ET AL., supra note 16, at 35-59. R 
20. Kasie Hunt, Lieberman Rips FBI on Miranda Rights, POLITICO (Jan. 25, 
2010), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/31969.html. 
701 
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United States until his entry into the country on the airliner he was 
charged with attempting to destroy.21 
Similar criticism was leveled against Attorney General Eric 
Holder’s decision to prosecute Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, often 
described as the chief planner of the September 11, 2001 attacks on 
the United States, in a federal district court rather than before a 
military court convened outside the United States.22  “Andrew Mc-
Carthy, [a] former Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney who led the pros­
ecution of the 1993 World Trade Center attacks,” maintained that 
the Attorney General “didn’t ‘understand what [the] rule of law has 
always been in wartime. . . .  It’s military commissions.  It’s not to 
wrap our enemies in our Bill of Rights.’”23  The proposed prosecu­
tion of Mohammed in Manhattan was also questioned by Demo­
cratic Senators Dianne Feinstein and Charles Schumer and by New 
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg.24  In February of 2010, Sena­
tor Lindsey Graham introduced a bill to preclude the expenditures 
of federal funds for civilian prosecutions of any crimes related to 
the events of September 11.25 
The spring of 2010 also brought reports from senior officials 
that the Obama Administration, despite some internal dissent, was 
on the verge of issuing regulations authorizing the indefinite deten­
tion without trial at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan of at least 
some persons believed by the Administration to be terrorists.26 
And in an address to the American Society of International Law 
delivered on March 29, 2010, Harold Koh, legal advisor to the State 
Department, maintained that the President had legal authority to 
indefinitely detain non-state actors without trial, at either Guanta­
namo or Bagram, if they met the Administration’s legal definition 
of “enemy belligerent.”27 
21. Glenn Greenwald, Susan Collins Spreads Central Myth About the Constitu­
tion, SALON.COM (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/ 
2010/02/01/collins. 
22. See Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, NEW  YORKER, Feb. 15, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/ 
02/15/100215fa_fact_mayer#ixzz0f3AOFd5E. 
23. Id. (quoting former Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew McCarthy). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. David S. Cloud & Julian E. Barnes, New Rules on Terror Custody Being 
Drafted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/15/nation/la-na­
obama-detention16-2010apr16. 
27. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama Admin­
istration and International Law, Address to Annual Meeting of the American Society 
of International Law, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/ 
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Finally, in March of 2011, the Obama Administration issued an 
executive order announcing the continued indefinite detention, 
without trial, of the 172 prisoners then still held at Guantanamo.28 
A month later, Attorney General Holder, by then facing a statutory 
ban on any transfer of prisoners from Guantanamo to the United 
States, even for the purpose of prosecution in civilian courts, an­
nounced that Khalid Sheik Muhammed and four other Guanta­
namo detainees would be prosecuted in military commissions 
convened at the naval base instead of the federal district court in 
Manhattan, as originally planned.29 
It is evident that more than eight years after September 11, 
2001, the day on which the attention of American political and legal 
institutions were riveted to the array of problems posed by terrorist 
violence, the scope and limits of the President’s military detention 
power remain largely unsettled.  In significant part, this uncertainty 
can be traced to the Supreme Court.  Despite deciding five signifi­
cant cases challenging Bush Administration policies concerning 
“enemy combatant” detainees since 2004, the Court has provided 
almost no guidance, as to either the President’s authority to adopt a 
preventive detention scheme of the sort outlined by President 
Obama and his task force, or to the principles, if any, that might 
govern or constrain its implementation.30  The Court’s dispositions 
of these cases reveal very little about the Justices’ views on the 
questions raised by the Administration’s plans to introduce a per­
manent system of preventive detention.  With respect to both the 
assertion of executive power such a program would entail, and the 
equally important specifics the President has not yet filled in, the 
Court has left ample room for almost any answer. 
To be sure, the Court’s “enemy combatant” decisions, all but 
one resolved at least in part against the executive branch, have lim­
ited presidential authority in some respects. And the Justices’ reti­
releases/remarks/139119.htm.  Mr. Koh stated that the legal standard for determining 
whether a detainee was an enemy belligerent “includes, but is not limited to, whether 
an individual joined with or became part of al-Qaeda or Taliban forces or associated 
forces, which can be demonstrated by relevant evidence of formal or functional mem­
bership, which may include an oath of loyalty, training with al-Qaeda, or taking posi­
tions with enemy forces.” Id. 
28. Executive Order: Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force, WHITEHOUSE. 
GOV (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/executive­
order-periodic-review-individuals-detained-guant-namo-bay-nava. 
29. Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9-11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/us/05gitmo.html?. 
30. See discussion infra notes 31-61. R 
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cence on the issues of great moment raised by the Bush (and now 
Obama) Administration’s claims of power to effect indefinite de­
tention without trial is consistent with a conception of judicial mod­
esty that is time honored, widely endorsed, and recently 
reinvigorated by contemporary champions of judicial minimalism.31 
This restrained conception of the judicial role was perhaps most ef­
fectively stated and defended almost half a century ago by Alexan­
der Bickel.32  Professor Bickel’s justly famous essay extols the 
“passive virtues” of various judge-made strategies and techniques 
for avoiding resolution of constitutional questions, especially those 
that are both controversial and significant.33  He links the legiti­
macy of the Supreme Court’s authority to impose its view of “what 
the law is” on a congress or President that may strongly disagree 
with a deliberate commitment by the Court to keep the expressions 
of such authority to an absolutely necessary minimum.34 
Some of the methods of limiting conflict between the courts 
and the elected branches are familiar tools of the craft of adjudica­
tion, such as addressing only those questions that must be resolved 
in order to decide the case at hand; resolving these questions on the 
narrowest available ground; leaving maximum space for the exer­
cise of political judgment on issues of broad importance; and, wher­
ever possible, relying on statutory, rather than constitutional, 
sources of law as the basis for decision.35  The Supreme Court’s use 
of these traditional techniques is in large part the reason the post-
September 11 cases it has decided have shed so little light on the 
President’s authority to effect non-criminal, preventive detention of 
persons he believes are likely to engage in terrorism. The impact of 
the Court’s restrained approach in these cases on the civil rights of 
detainees, on the practical utility of constitutional limits in checking 
presidential power, and even on the efficacy of rule of law values 
31. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A  SUICIDE  PACT: THE  CONSTITU­
TION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006) (arguing that that the judicial branch 
has little, if any, legitimate role in checking anti-terrorism measures taken by the politi­
cal branches in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE 
CASE AT A  TIME: JUDICIAL  MINIMALISM ON THE  SUPREME  COURT (1999) (endorsing 
the Supreme Court’s avoidance of broad statements of constitutional principle in favor 
of decisions drawn on narrow grounds and making only incremental changes in settled 
legal understandings). 
32. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: 
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
33. Id. at 47-51. 
34. See id. at 77-78. 
35. See id. at 43-47 (describing judicial techniques that are employed by the 
judiciary). 
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generally is a matter of considerable and justified controversy.36 
But criticism of the Court on these consequential grounds, however 
persuasive, is unlikely to dissuade the Justices from treading as cau­
tiously and lightly as they can whenever they see themselves as con­
strained by law to invalidate measures taken by the President in the 
name of national security. 
Professor Bickel’s argument was not primarily a defense of the 
Supreme Court’s reliance on narrow grounds for decision in cases it 
did resolve, though he surely did embrace that approach.  Instead, 
Bickel’s signal contribution was his justification of a series of judge-
made strategies for avoiding resolution of the merits of controver­
sial cases altogether.37  Bickel maintained that these strategies ena­
bled the Court to defer resolution, especially of momentous 
constitutional issues, to a time when political controversy surround­
ing them has abated, making a principled rather than expedient de­
cision more likely.38  His argument fostered and buttressed the 
Supreme Court’s development of such “prudential” grounds for 
non-decision as the political question doctrine, the generalized 
grievance and third party bars to standing to sue, and the ripeness 
and mootness limitations on otherwise justiciable cases.39  The doc­
trines are prudential in two senses.  First, they are designed by and 
for judges, as self-limiting techniques, as opposed to being required 
either by statute or the Constitution itself.40  And second, because 
they are judge made, they may be invoked on a largely discretion­
ary basis, at times and in ways that focus the exercise of judicial 
36. See generally JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESI­
DENTIAL  POWER (2006) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions invalidating the post-
September 11 detention practices of the Bush Administration have had little impact on 
the implementation of these practices); FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR. AND AZIZ Z. 
HUQ, UNCHECKED AND  UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL  POWER IN A  TIME OF TERROR 
(2007) (same);  CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, EIGHT O’ CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD 
SIDE: SEEKING  JUSTICE AT  GUANTANAMO  BAY  (2007) (pointing out the continuing 
and often successful efforts of military and defense department officials to thwart 
Guantanamo detainees’ access to counsel, even after the Supreme Court’s affirmation 
of their right to such access). Contra JOHN  YOO, WAR BY OTHER  MEANS: AN  IN­
SIDER’S ACCOUNT ON THE WAR ON TERROR (2006) (claiming that the President’s exec­
utive and commander-in-chief powers are essentialy plenary and that his exercise of 
these powers to prevent terrorism is not properly subject to judicial review). 
37. Bickel, supra note 32, at 77-78. R 
38. Id. at 74-75. 
39. Id. at 42-51. 
40. Id. at 46 (“The political-question doctrine simply resists being domesticated in 
this fashion.  There is something different about it, in kind, not in degree, from the 
general ‘interpretive process’; something greatly more flexible, something of prudence, 
not construction and not principle.” (internal citations omitted)). 
705 
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power less on the immediate remedial needs of the parties and 
more on the Court’s institutional preference for rationing its ex­
pressions of legal disagreement with the elected branches.41  The 
Justices’ deliberate fashioning of techniques aimed at undermining 
the obligatory character of judicial review is also justifiably contro­
versial and arguably inconsistent with the notion of law as a con­
straining force on courts as well as the political branches.42  But the 
techniques themselves, for better or worse, are also now embedded 
in our legal landscape. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s adoption of Bickel’s strat­
egy of discretionary, selective passivity has not been unprincipled. 
As elaborated by the Court’s decisions,43 the passive virtues have 
their own limits.  And with respect to the important questions 
posed by the current and immediately previous Presidents’ execu­
tion of their claimed power to detain terrorism suspects without 
trial, the Supreme Court seriously violated those limits by deciding 
not to resolve a case it had accepted for review in its 2008-2009 
term. The case is Al-Marri v. Spagone, which the Court unjustifi­
ably dismissed as moot on March 6, 2009.44  By dismissing this ap­
peal, the Court ignored its duty to determine whether the military 
detention of a non-citizen residing lawfully in the United States was 
authorized by law.  And that failure has in turn contributed signifi­
cantly, and unnecessarily, to the cloud of legal uncertainty which 
now hovers over the preventive detention measures adopted and 
proposed by  the Obama Administration. 
I. THE AL-MARRI LITIGATION 
A.	 Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri: Criminal Defendant, Enemy 
Combatant, Criminal Defendant Redux 
Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri is a citizen of Qatar.45  In the 1980s 
and early 1990s, he studied computer science at Bradley University 
in Peoria, Illinois, which awarded him a bachelor’s degree in 1991.46 
41. Id. at 50-51. 
42. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 6 (1961). 
43. See discussion infra Part II.E. 
44. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009). 
45. Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774, 776 (D.S.C. 2006), 
vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. 
Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. 1545. 
46. Al-Marri, 543 F.3d at 344; Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Al-Marri v. 
Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th. Cir. 2008) (No. 08-368). 
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After graduating, Al-Marri returned to Qatar where he lived until 
at least 1996.47  According to an affidavit of a Defense Department 
analyst, Al-Marri traveled to Afghanistan sometime between 1996 
and 1998 where he received training in use of poisons at an al-
Qaeda Camp.48 
Al-Marri returned to Illinois, legally, in the summer of 2000 
and allegedly registered a business and opened bank accounts 
under a false name and Social Security number before returning to 
Afghanistan.49  In the summer of 2001, according to the Defense 
Department affidavit, Al-Marri met with Khalid Sheikh Muham­
med and Osama Bin Laden, who directed him to re-enter the 
United States before September 11, 2001 to support terrorist activi­
ties by disrupting the nation’s financial system through computer 
hacking.50  Thereafter, Al-Marri was alleged to have received funds 
from Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hawsawi, who is believed by American 
intelligence analysts to have provided financial support for the Sep­
tember 11 attacks.51 
On September 10, 2001, Al-Marri again lawfully re-entered the 
United States with his wife and five children, and enrolled again at 
Bradley University, ostensibly in order to pursue a master’s de­
gree.52  Over the next three months, he was a subject of law en­
forcement surveillance which included surveillance by agents of the 
FBI.53  The FBI’s investigation included at least two interviews with 
Al-Marri and a search of his computer, which allegedly produced 
evidence that he had gathered information about poisonous chemi­
cals and retained copies of lectures by Osama Bin Laden and un­
47. Jane Mayer, The Hard Cases, NEW  YORKER, Feb. 23, 2009, http://www.new 
yorker.com/reporting/2009/02/23/090223fa_fact_mayer. 
48. See Declaration of Mr. Jeffrey N. Rapp, Director, Joint Intelligence Task 
Force for Combating Terrorism ¶ 10, at 5, Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673 
(D.S.C. 2005) (No. 2:04-2257-26AJ), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/ 
nation/documents/jeffreyrapp_document.pdf [hereinafter Rapp Declaration]. 
49. Id. ¶ 33-34, at 13-15. 
50. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, at 5-6. 
51. Id. ¶ 14, at 6. 
52. Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774, 776 (D.S.C. 2006), 
rev’d sub nom. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. 
Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct, 1545 (2009); Andy Worthington, The Last US Enemy 
Combatant: The Shocking Story of Ali al-Marri (Apr. 12, 2008), http://www.andy 
worthington.co.uk/2008/12/04/the-last-us-enemy-combatant-the-shocking-story-of-ali­
al-marri/. 
53. Mayer, supra note 47. R 
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sent emails allegedly addressed to an account connected to Kahlid 
Sheikh Muhammed.54 
On December 12, 2001, FBI agents arrested Al-Marri in Peoria 
and took him to New York City.55  He was held incommunicado in 
federal custody at a maximum security prison on the ground that he 
was a material witness in the investigation into the September 11 
attacks.56  In February of 2002, Al-Marri was indicted in New York 
on federal charges of credit card fraud.57  In January of 2003, he was 
indicted a second time for using false identification and making 
false statements on a bank application.58  After these charges were 
dismissed for lack of proper venue in New York,59 federal officials 
returned Al-Marri to Peoria where he was re-indicted for all the 
same crimes.60  The U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
Illinois set a trial date of July 21, 2003.61  On Friday, June 20, the 
district court also calendared a hearing on the parties’ pre-trial 
motions.62 
The most significant of these motions was one filed by Al­
Marri’s lawyers to exclude evidence against him provided by Khalid 
Sheikh Muhammed and Mustaffa Al-Harsawi, on the ground that it 
had been obtained by torture.63  These men, the primary sources for 
the information about Al-Marri contained in the Defense Depart­
ment affidavit mentioned above, are perhaps now known best as 
“high-level” detainees held by the CIA at so-called “black sites.”64 
It has now been reported widely, and officially in a report of the 
CIA Inspector General, that one of these men, Mr. Muhammed, 
was subjected to waterboarding by CIA interrogators one hundred 
eighty three times.65  On the next business day after the judge’s cal­
endaring order, Monday, June 23, President Bush issued an execu­
tive order declaring Al-Marri to be an enemy combatant closely 
associated with al-Qaeda, who “engaged in . . . conduct in prepara­
54. See Rapp Declaration, supra note 48, ¶¶ 16-20, 25, at 7-10. R 
55. Al-Marri, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 776. 
56. Worthington, supra note 52. R 
57. Rapp Declaration, supra note 48, ¶ 32, at 13. R 
58. Id. ¶ 34, at 14-15. 
59. Al-Marri, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 776. 
60. Rapp Declaration, supra note 48, ¶ 34, at 15. R 
61. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008). 
62. Id. 
63. See Brief for Appellants at 66-70, Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 
2006) (No. 06-7427). 
64. See id. 
65. Jane Mayer, The Trial, NEW  YORKER, Feb. 15, 2010, http://www.newyorker. 
com/reporting/2010/02/15/100215/fa_fact_mayer. 
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tion for acts of international terrorism” and “represents a continu­
ing, present, and grave danger to the national security of the United 
States.”66  Significantly, the executive order also stated that “al-
Marri possess[ed] intelligence . . . that . . . would aid U.S. efforts to 
prevent attacks by al-Qaeda.”67  The order then directed the Attor­
ney General to surrender Al-Marri to the custody of the Secretary 
of Defense in order to effect his indefinite military detention.68 
On the basis of this order, the Justice Department moved to 
dismiss the criminal indictment against Al-Marri.69  The district 
court granted the motion with prejudice.70  Al-Marri was then 
transferred to the U.S. Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina, 
where he remained for more than five and one-half years.71  Then, 
in March of 2009, as the U.S. Supreme Court prepared to review 
the legality of his military detention, Al-Marri was again charged 
with federal crimes, this time material support for terrorism and 
conspiracy to provide such material support, transferred from mili­
tary detention back to the custody of the Justice Department, and 
returned to federal prison.72 
B. Al-Marri’s Treatment While in Military Detention 
There were no judicial findings of fact as to the conditions of 
Al-Marri’s military detention or his treatment during his five and 
one-half years at the Charlestown Brig.  It is clear, though, that for 
the first sixteen months of his detention, Al-Marri was prevented 
from seeing or speaking with his attorneys.73  Only in October of 
2004, three months after the Supreme Court ruled that enemy com­
batants could not be completely deprived of access to counsel,74 
66. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Secretary of Defense 
and the Attorney General, FINDLAW.COM (June 23, 2003), available at http://fl1.findlaw. 
com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/almarri/almarri62303exord.pdf. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See Justice Department’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Al-Marri v. Rum­
sfeld, No. 2:05-2259-HFF-RSC (D.S.C. June 14, 2006). 
70. Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774, 776 (D.S.C. 2006), 
rev’d sub nom. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. 
Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct, 1545 (2009). 
71. Worthington, supra note 52. R 
72. John Schwartz, Accused Qaeda Sleeper Agent in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/us/24marri.html. 
73. Worthington, supra note 52. R 
74. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (stating that Hamdi “unques­
tionably has the right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on 
remand”). 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE301.txt unknown Seq: 13 30-SEP-11 8:12 
2011] NO VIRTUE IN PASSIVITY 709 
were his lawyers permitted to meet with him, in the presence of 
prison guards, and with Al-Marri in shackles bolted to the floor.75 
It is also clear, from Defense Department documents released 
under the Freedom of Information Act, that interrogations of de­
tainees at the brig were conducted using the same techniques as 
those employed at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.76  These in­
cluded “prolonged isolation, painful stress positions, exposure to 
extreme temperature, sleep deprivation, extreme sensory depriva­
tion, and threats of violence and death.”77 
In addition, Al-Marri’s lawyers have claimed that for the six­
teen months between the beginning of his detention at the brig and 
their initial meeting with him, Al-Marri: 
[W]as denied any contact with the world outside, including his 
family, his lawyers, and the Red Cross. . . . Mr. Almarri’s only 
regular human contact during that period was with government 
officials during interrogation sessions, or with guards when they 
delivered trays of food through a slot in his cell door, escorted 
him to the shower, or took him to a concrete cage for “recrea­
tion.”  The guards had duct tape over their name badges and did 
not speak to Mr. Almarri except to give him orders.78 
Al-Marri’s lawyers also allege that Al-Marri’s interrogators 
told him “that they would send him to Egypt or to Saudi Arabia to 
be tortured and sodomized and forced to watch as his wife was 
raped in front of him.”79  Additionally, his lawyers allege that the 
interrogators stuffed Al-Marri’s mouth with cloth and gagged him 
with duct tape, kept him cold for up to eight days at a time for 
refusing to answer their questions, and prevented him from praying 
and otherwise observing the tenets of his Islamic faith.80 
After Al-Marri was permitted to see his lawyers, the conditions 
of his detention gradually improved.81  Still, for another ten 
months, until August 2005, he was, again according to his lawyers, 
75. Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 
Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Interim Relief From Prolonged Isolation and Other Un­
lawful Conditions of Confinement at 4 n.1, Al-Marri v. Gates, No. C/A 2:05-2259-HFF­
RSC (D.S.C. May 6, 2008), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/bd04de8ef937e4ec17_dl 
m6ib16o.pdf [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Objections]. 
76. Worthington, supra note 52. R 
77. Id.; see also Plaintiff’s Objections, supra note 75, at 2. R 
78. See Plaintiff’s Objections, supra note 75, at 2. R 
79. Id. at 2-3. 
80. Id. at 3. 
81. Id. at 4 (stating that “direct interrogations of Mr. Almarri ceased after he was 
finally allowed access to his lawyers”). 
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confined to a nine-by-six foot cell, with its single window covered, 
and provided with no chair, blanket, mattress, pillow, or reading 
material for months at a time.82  This confinement was unremit­
ting—“twenty four hours a day, seven days a week.”83  On one oc­
casion, he was forcibly restrained to his metal bed, in extremely 
cold temperatures, for twenty days.84 
From late August 2005, when his lawyers sued Defense Depart­
ment officials challenging this treatment, until March of 2009 when 
his military detention ended, Al Marri’s confinement was far more 
humane.85  The suit was prompted by the lawyers’ fear that Al-
Marri was collapsing and that the conditions he lived under in the 
brig were causing a mental health emergency.86  Despite the suit, 
and the change in his treatment that coincided with its filing, Al-
Marri still was not permitted contact with his family.87  He learned 
of the death of his father only a year after the fact.88  Only in April 
of 2008 was Al-Marri allowed the first of two phone conversations 
with family members,89 before President Obama ended his military 
detention and directed that his criminal prosecution resume.90 
C. The Challenge to Al-Marri’s Military Detention 
Long before their emergency challenge to Al-Marri’s treat­
ment in military detention, in fact within two weeks of President 
Bush’s determination that he was an enemy combatant, Al-Marri’s 
lawyers, on July 8, 2003, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus seek­
ing his release.91  They filed the habeas petition in the U.S. District 
Court for the Central District of Illinois, the district where his crim­
inal prosecution had been recommenced earlier that year.92  The 
lawyers learned to their chagrin (though not to Al-Marri’s, since, 
held incommunicado, he knew nothing about the proceedings) that 
South Carolina, the location of the Charleston Navy Brig, not Illi­
82. Id. at 4-5. 
83. Id. at 5. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 6-7. 
86. Id. at 8-9. 
87. Id. at 7. 
88. Id. at 7 n.5. 
89. Id. at 7. 
90. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Transfer of Detainee to 
Control of the Attorney General to Secretary of Defense (Feb. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD200900110.htm. 
91. Al-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1004-05 (C.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d, 360 
F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 809. (2004). 
92. See id. at 1004. 
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nois, was the only proper venue for their petition.93  The learning 
process, consisting of a dismissal by the district court,94 affirmance 
of the dismissal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir­
cuit,95 and denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court,96 took nearly 
a year. 
On July 8, 2004, Al-Marri’s lawyers re-filed the habeas peti­
tion, this time in the U.S. District Court for the District of South 
Carolina.97  The petition claimed that neither the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force (AUMF), enacted by Congress just after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, nor the Constitution granted the Presi­
dent the power to hold Al-Marri in military detention.98  The peti­
tion emphasized that at the time he was seized, Al-Marri was a legal 
resident of the United States, that he was not a citizen of nor affili­
ated with the armed forces of any nation at war with the United 
States, that he was not apprehended on or near a battlefield on 
which American forces were engaged in combat, and that he was 
never in Afghanistan during the war between the United States and 
the Taliban which commenced in the Fall of 2001.99  For these rea­
sons, the habeas petition argued that Al-Marri could not be classi­
fied as a military combatant against the United States but must 
instead be treated as a civilian, subject to detention only through 
the processes of the criminal law.100 
In response, the Justice Department produced the Defense De­
partment affidavit referred to above and argued that Al-Marri’s so­
journ in Afghanistan, which ended on September 10, 2001, his close 
association with al-Qaeda, an organization with which the United 
States is at war, and his actions on al-Qaeda’s behalf, regardless of 
their timing or location, were sufficient to warrant the President’s 
decision to hold him indefinitely in military custody.101  The district 
court rejected Al-Marri’s argument, holding that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hamdi authorized his military detention and 
93. Id. at 1009-10. 
94. Id. 
95. Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F. Supp. 3d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 2004). 
96. Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 543 U.S. 809, 809 (2004). 
97. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 
443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (D.S.C. 2006) (No. 2:04 2257-HFF). 
98. Petitioners’ Reply (Traverse) to Respondent’s Answer to the Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus at 5-13, Al-Marri ex rel. Berman, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (No. 2:04-2257­
HFF). 
99. See id. at 20. 
100. Id. 
101. Respondent’s Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 19, Al-
Marri ex rel. Berman, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (No. 2:04-2257-HFF). 
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that the Defense Department affidavit provided a sufficient basis 
for his designation as an enemy combatant.102  In August of 2006, 
three years after President Bush first placed him in military cus­
tody, the district court dismissed Al-Marri’s habeas corpus 
petition.103 
On appeal, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit reversed.104  The majority opinion of Judge Di­
ana Gibbon Motz adopted the line drawn by Al-Marri’s lawyers be­
tween combatants, subject to military jurisdiction and detention, 
and civilians, subject to detention only attendant to prosecution for 
crimes in civilian courts.105  Though the AUMF did authorize the 
President to detain enemy combatants in the military struggle trig­
gered by the September 11 attacks, Judge Motz’s opinion held that 
the authorization was limited to persons actually engaged in combat 
against the United States, and did not confer power on the Presi­
dent to seize a non-combatant living in the United States, even if he 
has committed crimes in aid “of an enemy organization.”106  For 
Judge Motz, enemy combatant status rested on a person’s affiliation 
during wartime with the “military arm of the enemy govern­
ment.”107  For purposes of the post-September 11 military campaign 
authorized by the AUMF, this meant the Taliban government of 
Afghanistan;108 it did not mean the trans-national al-Qaeda net­
work.  Al-Marri was thus a civilian, not a combatant.109  And as a 
civilian legally residing in the United States at the time of his arrest, 
he enjoyed the due process right to be imprisoned only through 
criminal prosecution in a civilian court.110  This same distinction be­
tween combatants and civilians, Judge Motz added, also limited the 
President’s ability to invoke his constitutional powers as Com­
mander-in-Chief to detain legal residents of the United States.111 
In dissent, Judge Henry Hudson did not entirely reject the ci­
vilian/combatant distinction.112  Rather, he argued that Al-Marri’s 
102. See Al-Marri ex rel Berman, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 784-85, rev’d sub nom. Al-
Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. 
Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009). 
103. Id. at 785. 
104. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 195 (4th Cir. 2007). 
105. Id. at 186. 
106. Id. at 187-89. 
107. Id. at 181 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37, 38 (1942)). 
108. See id. 
109. See id. at 187. 
110. Id. at 193. 
111. Id. 
112. See id. at 196 n.1 (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
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alleged training with al-Qaeda and September 10 entry into the 
United States to engage in terrorist activities on al-Qaeda’s behalf 
were sufficient to place him on the combatant side of the line.113  In 
Judge Hudson’s view, the power conferred on the President by the 
AUMF to detain enemy combatants extended beyond persons act­
ing for the military arm of an enemy government (the Taliban) to 
include persons aiding the use of force by an enemy organization 
(al-Qaeda).114 
The Fourth Circuit panel’s instruction to the district court to 
grant Al-Marri’s habeas corpus petition, issued on June 11, 2007, 
was vacated by the judges of the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc.115 
The en banc court also granted the government’s motion for re­
hearing.116  On July 15, 2008, thirteen months after the panel deci­
sion, the nine judges of the en banc court issued a remarkably 
fragmented ruling.117  Four judges, including Judge Motz, would 
have affirmed the panel.118  Four others essentially agreed with 
Judge Hudson.119  The ninth, Judge David Traxler, concurred with 
Judge Hudson’s enemy combatant analysis, thus providing a narrow 
majority to sustain the President’s power to hold Al-Marri in mili­
tary detention.120  But Judge Traxler also held that the Defense De­
partment affidavit relied on by the district court might not be 
sufficient, for due process purposes, to justify military detention of 
a person, like Al-Marri, who was arrested at his home while resid­
ing legally in the United States.121  Joined by the four Judges who 
supported the panel decision, Judge Traxler remanded Al-Marri’s 
petition to the district court for further evidentiary proceedings.122 
Significantly, Judge Traxler’s controlling opinion acknowledged that 
the President could classify American citizens, as well as lawful resi­
113. Id. at 198. 
114. See id. at 199. 
115. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F. 3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. 
Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009). 
116. Brief for Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant 
Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-7427 2:04-cv­
002257-HFF), vacated sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009), available 
at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_50553.pdf. 
117. Al-Marri, 534 F. 3d at 216. 
118. Id. at 213. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 268 (“And I cannot endorse such a view, which would allow the gov­
ernment to seize and militarily detain any person (including American citizens within 
this country) and support such military detention solely with a hearsay declaration of a 
government official who has no first-hand information about the detainee . . . .”). 
122. See id. at 276. 
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dent aliens like Al-Marri, as enemy combatants subject to indefinite 
military detention without trial.123 
On September 19, 2008, Al-Marri filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari in the Supreme Court, presenting the following question 
for review: 
Does the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
. . . authorize—and if so does the Constitution allow—the seizure 
and indefinite military detention of a person lawfully residing in 
the United States, without criminal charge or trial, based on gov­
ernment assertions that the detainee conspired with al Qaeda to 
engage in terrorist activities?124 
On December 8, 2008, the Court granted the petition.125  Then, 
shortly following his inauguration, and just after Al-Marri’s opening 
brief was submitted, President Obama issued an executive order di­
recting the Justice Department to review the circumstances of his 
detention and the litigation challenging its legality and to report the 
results of this review to him.126  On February 27, 2009, less than a 
week before the government’s brief to the Supreme Court was due, 
the Justice Department announced Al-Marri’s indictment on new 
charges of conspiring to provide, and of providing, material support 
for terrorism.127  On that same day, the President ended Al-Marri’s 
military detention, directing the Justice Department to reassume re­
sponsibility for his custody.128  The Justice Department then moved 
to dismiss Al-Marri’s certiorari petition as moot.129  On March 6, 
the Supreme Court granted that motion, vacating the Fourth Cir­
123. See id. 
124. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 
(2008) (No. 08-368). 
125. Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. at 1245. 
126. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Review of the Detention of 
Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri to the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec­
retary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intel­
ligent 1, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. No. DCPD2009000111 (Jan. 22, 2009), available 
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD200900011.pdf. 
127. Indictment at 1-2, United States v. Al-Marri, No. 09-CR-10030 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 
26, 2009); see also Carrie Johnson & Julie Tate, Combatant Case to Move from Tribunal 
to U.S. Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2009/02/26/AR2009022601892.html. 
128. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Transfer of Detainee to 
Control of the Attorney General to Secretary of Defense, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 
No. DCPD200900110, (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/ 
2009/DCPD200900110.htm. 
129. Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Vacate the Judgment Below and 
Remand with Directions to Dismiss the Case as Moot at 5, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. 
Ct. 1545 (2009) (No. 08-368), 2009 WL 526212. 
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cuit’s en banc judgment.130  Its order cited one case, the Court’s 
1950 decision in United States v. Munsingwear.131 
II.	 THE SUPREME COURT AND POST 9-11 MILITARY DETENTION 
BEFORE AL-MARRI 
It is probably hard to exaggerate the gravity of the question 
presented by Al-Marri’s certiorari petition.132  The Fourth Circuit’s 
en banc decision effectively sustained the President’s power to seize 
on American soil any person living legally in the United States, citi­
zen or alien, and to detain that person, without trial, at least for the 
duration of the military engagement authorized by the AUMF, on 
the basis of his belief that the detainee is a terrorist.133  If the Presi­
dent does indeed have this extraordinary authority, the liberty most 
Americans assume to be their birthright is, as a practical matter, a 
trifling impediment to a President determined (perhaps under­
standably to many people) to do everything in his power to prevent 
another attack of the sort visited on the nation on September 11. 
Because of the danger to liberty it presents, judicial sanction of un­
checked executive power to imprison citizens indefinitely without 
trial is also, to say the least, a profound and obvious threat to the 
democratic accountability of government and to the active political 
participation of citizens that is essential to self-rule.134 
If the conception of presidential prerogatives ratified by the 
Fourth Circuit effects a radical distribution of power away from the 
people and towards a largely unchecked executive, it also raises a 
130. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.). 
131. Id.; see United States v. Musingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950) (noting that 
“[t]he established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the 
federal system which has become moot . . . is to reverse or vacate the judgment below 
and remand with a direction to dismiss”). 
132. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 
(2008) (mem.) (No. 08-368). 
133. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 2008).  Motz states, 
“Our colleagues hold that the President can order the military to seize from his home 
and indefinitely detain anyone in this country—including an American citizen—even 
though he has never affiliated with an enemy nation, fought alongside any nation’s 
armed forces, or borne arms against the United States anywhere in the world.” Id. 
134. See FREDERICK O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBAL­
ANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 200-03 (2007) (outlining the dan­
gers of unchecked executive power and the necessary participation of the public to 
curtail it); see also Arlen Specter, The Need to Roll Back Presidential Power Grabs, 
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 14, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22656. 
See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL  QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL  ANSWERS: DOES 
THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 76-90 (1992) (describing judicial un­
willingness to abdicate judgment to the executive concerning individual rights). 
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set of more discrete but nonetheless vexing questions, including, at 
a minimum, the following: if the war powers granted the President 
by the AUMF extend beyond the battlefield against the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan, what are their geographical and politi­
cal limits, if any?  Is the theatre of war envisioned by the AUMF 
the entire world, including the domestic United States?  Has Con­
gress authorized the President to make war  only on enemy nation-
states, as Judge Motz believed, or also on groups, or even individu­
als, of his own choosing?  If the AUMF does authorize the Presi­
dent to wage war on sub-national (or super-national) political 
groups, and thus to detain individuals affiliated with such groups, is 
it really true, as a majority of the judges of the Fourth Circuit be­
lieved,135 that this power applies equally and in the same ways to 
American citizens and legal resident non-citizens alike?  Are the 
processes due citizen and non-citizen detainees in order to deter­
mine the legality of their detentions also the same?  Does the an­
swer depend on where a detainee is taken into custody?  Does it 
depend on where he is alleged to have engaged in combat against 
the United States? 
The Fourth Circuit, through the various opinions, addresses all 
of these issues exclusively through the lens provided by the AUMF. 
There remains, of course, the possibility that the military detention 
authority of the President granted by that statute is augmented by 
the inherent powers he may enjoy under Article II of the Constitu­
tion.  This was the position that was urged throughout the Al-Marri 
litigation by the Bush Administration.136  Conversely, it is also pos­
sible that some powers conferred by the AUMF are themselves vio­
lations of the Bill of Rights, as Al-Marri’s certiorari petition 
contended.137  Al-Marri’s sojourn in the Charleston Navy Brig 
leaves no doubt that an important reason for the President’s deci­
sion to detain him militarily was, as the June 23, 2003 executive 
order implicitly acknowledged, to interrogate him about his alleged 
connection to al-Qaeda.138  Is this a lawful purpose of military de­
tention?  Is interrogation a more (or less) justifiable goal of such 
135. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 276. 
136. See, e.g., id. at 247. 
137. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari  at 11-12, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. 
Ct. 680 (2008) (mem.) (No. 08-368). 
138. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Secretary of De­
fense and the Attorney General (June 23, 2003), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/ 
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/almarri/almarri62303exord.pdf. 
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detention when a detainee, like Al-Marri, is not a member of or 
affiliated with the military forces of a nation-state? 
All of these issues are embedded in the question presented by 
Al-Marri’s petition for certiorari.139  As suggested in the introduc­
tion to this paper, the Supreme Court’s post-September 11 deci­
sions about the sources, scope, and limits of the President’s powers 
regarding alleged terrorist detainees shed remarkably little light on 
any of them.  In one respect, this may be surprising because there 
were five such decisions between 2004 and 2008,140 and the Presi­
dent’s position was rejected by the Justices, at least in significant 
part, in four of them141 and not addressed at all in the fifth.142  But 
the Court’s use of the passive virtues of narrow disposition and nar­
rowly articulated rationales assured, perhaps inevitably, that just 
about any resolution of the issues raised by Al-Marri was plausibly 
consistent with its rulings.  The close yet quite fundamental divide 
on the Fourth Circuit was a predictable result of the judges’ com­
mitment to caution. 
Of course it would be inaccurate and unfair to claim that the 
Supreme Court’s detention decisions resolved nothing.  But a brief 
review of the five cases shows how much they left unaddressed and 
thus how important the Al-Marri petition was to a resolution of the 
central challenges to our constitutional order presented by our gov­
ernment’s response to the events of September 11, 2001. 
A. Hamdi 
Of the Supreme Court’s five significant post-September 11 de­
cisions, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld offers the most insight into the Justices’ 
possible views of the issues raised by Al-Marri’s detention.143  In 
Hamdi, a narrow majority of the Court sustained the President’s 
power under the AUMF to detain an American citizen captured in 
139. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. 680 
(No. 08-368). 
140. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
141. See generally Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723; Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557; Hamdi, 542 
U.S. 507; Rasul, 542 U.S. 466. 
142. See generally Padilla, 542 U.S. 426. 
143. See generally Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507. 
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Afghanistan while fighting with the army of that country against 
U.S. Forces.144 
But the Court’s disposition of Hamdi, despite its examination 
of both the powers granted the President by the AUMF and the 
limits on those powers imposed by the due process clause, is re­
markably narrow.145  Justice O’Connor’s opinion, for a plurality of 
four justices, read the AUMF to set a firm foundation under a lim­
ited and traditional account of the President’s war making power, 
but offered no hint as to where the ceiling on that power might 
lie.146  And with respect to the due process limitations on the exer­
cise of AUMF authority at issue in Hamdi, the opinion defined only 
the process due a military detainee who is a citizen of the U.S., 
leaving unaddressed how much, if any, protection might be re­
quired for a similarly situated non-citizen.147 
1. Hamdi on Presidential Power 
Hamdi’s narrowness is a function of the unusual configuration 
of facts it presented.  Yaser Hamdi was an American citizen, cap­
tured in Afghanistan while allegedly fighting with the military 
forces of that nation shortly after the American military invasion 
which commenced in the late autumn of 2001.148  As a member of 
the military arm of a foreign nation engaged in combat against an 
invading military force on the territory of that nation, Hamdi was, 
when captured, indistinguishable from a prisoner of war.149  His de­
tention, in order to prevent his return to a conventional battlefield 
in a conventional military conflict between the United States and 
Afghanistan, thus lay at the apex of any war making authority con­
ferred by the AUMF.150  If an American citizen could ever be de­
tained without trial as a war measure, that citizen was Yaser Hamdi. 
Thus, if the circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s capture were as al­
144. Id. at 517.  Justice Thomas “agree[d] with the plurality that the Federal Gov­
ernment ha[d] power to detain” Hamdi, thus providing a majority for this assertion. Id. 
at 589 (Thomas J., dissenting). 
145. See id. 
146. Id. (“We do not reach the question whether Article II provides such author­
ity” to detain individuals.). 
147. See id. at 533-35 (outlining minimum standards for citizen-detainee 
proceedings). 
148. Id. at 507, 510, 512-13. 
149. See id. at 513. 
150. See id. at 518 (“We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the 
limited category we are considering . . . is so fundamental and accepted an incident to 
war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has author­
ized the President to use.”). 
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leged by our government, it is unsurprising that Justice O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Kennedy and Breyer, sustained the President’s power to hold him 
for the duration of the American war in Afghanistan.151  And, if 
Hamdi was functionally equivalent to a prisoner of war, this power 
to hold him was not diminished by the different label—enemy com­
batant—that he was assigned.  For Justice O’Connor, if the AUMF 
authorized the United States to wage war in Afghanistan, the au­
thority to hold Hamdi in military detention easily followed.152 
With respect to the war power of the President, Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Hamdi was otherwise a model 
of caution.  It was silent on whether, or for how long, the AUMF 
authorizes military detentions in conflicts other than the American 
war waged in Afghanistan against the Taliban government of that 
country.153  And even with respect to that war, the opinion did not 
reach the question whether the AUMF authorizes military deten­
tion of alleged combatants who are apprehended away from a tradi­
tionally defined battlefield, i.e., outside Afghanistan.154  Nor did it 
address whether conduct of an alleged combatant that occurred 
before the enactment of the AUMF is included among the acts 
against which the statute empowers the President to apply military 
force.155  A bit offhandedly perhaps, because buttressed by no ref­
erence to supporting authority, Justice O’Connor did offer that 
“[c]ertainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of 
interrogation is not authorized” by the AUMF.156  But as to 
whether this limitation attaches to all military detentions, or applies 
more narrowly only to Taliban fighters captured on the Afghan bat­
tlefield, or even applies just to those traditional battlefield detain­
ees who are also American citizens, her opinion offers no secure 
conclusions. 
No doubt the application of military force under the AUMF 
sustained by Yaser Hamdi’s case would be equally lawful if used 
against a similarly situated non-citizen.  In this important respect, 
the Hamdi decision did clarify the President’s military detention 
authority in the narrow circumstances personified by Mr. Hamdi: 
151. See id. at 520-21. 
152. See id. at 518-19. 
153. See id. at 521. 
154. See id. 
155. The government alleged that Hamdi fought with the Taliban after September 
11. Id. at 513. 
156. Id. at 521. 
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that authority applies to combatants captured in Afghanistan after 
the enactment of the AUMF, while fighting with the military arm of 
the Taliban government, for the duration of the war between the 
United States and Afghanistan that commenced in the fall of 
2001.157  But beyond this endorsement of a most traditional, rela­
tively uncontroversial conception of the power conferred by the 
AUMF, Hamdi resolves very little.  And, of course, because the de­
cision confirmed the President’s authority to detain Hamdi under 
the AUMF alone, it quite properly also had nothing to offer regard­
ing the scope or limits of any inherent war power the President may 
have under Article II of the Constitution.158 
Though Yaser Hamdi’s American citizenship did not exempt 
him from military detention, it is far from clear whether and in what 
respects such citizenship might limit the President’s detention au­
thority under circumstances even slightly different from those 
presented in his case. Hamdi was decided by a vote of 5-4.  All four 
dissenters believed that Hamdi’s American citizenship precluded 
his military detention.  Justices Scalia and Stevens argued that 
American citizens are categorically beyond the war powers of the 
President and Congress.159  Yaser Hamdi, they argued, could be im­
prisoned only pursuant to prosecution, either for federal statutory 
crimes or for the constitutional offense of treason.160  Justices Gins-
burg and Souter maintained that the federal Anti-Detention Act of 
1970 barred the detention of an American citizen in the absence of 
a criminal conviction, unless authorized by an Act of Congress.161 
The AUMF, in their view, was insufficiently specific to provide the 
necessary authorization.162  Thus, if just one of the Justices in the 
Hamdi plurality, or their successors, were to view the President’s 
power to detain an American citizen differently in some situations 
not sharing all of the attributes of a traditional battlefield capture, a 
new majority might rely on the citizenship-based limits recognized 
by the Hamdi dissenters to qualify the President’s authority in that 
situation. 
157. See id. at 517-21. 
158. See id. at 517. 
159. See id. at 559-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
160. Id. at 554. 
161. Id. at 540 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
162. Id. at 547-49. 
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2. Hamdi on Due Process 
The likely significance of citizenship-based constraints on the 
President’s military detention authority may be even clearer with 
respect to the due process limits on that authority recognized by a 
majority of the justices in Hamdi.  Although Hamdi, because of the 
circumstances of his capture, fell into a category of persons that 
could be subjected to military detention, he was entitled under the 
Fifth Amendment to an appropriate hearing as to whether the facts 
that placed him into that category were true.163  Thus, Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion for the Court, joined for this purpose 
by Justices Ginsburg and Souter, held that Hamdi was entitled to 
appropriate notice of the basis for the military’s belief that he was 
an enemy combatant and to a military hearing before a neutral de­
cision maker, at which he could be represented by counsel, to deter­
mine whether that belief was sufficiently well founded.164  To be 
sure, the Government would enjoy many advantages at the hearing 
that would not apply in a criminal prosecution.  Any evidence it 
offered would be presumed true, subject to rebuttal by Hamdi.165 
Neither hearsay nor confrontation clause limitations could be in­
voked to exclude any evidence from the hearing record.166  And the 
role, if any, of Article III courts in reviewing the results of the mili­
tary proceeding was left unspecified. 
Despite these limitations, the Court’s disposition in Hamdi left 
no doubt that the due process clause protects even battlefield de­
tainees, at least when they are American citizens.167  But on the 
question of whether the Hamdi protections extend to non-citizens, 
who are the overwhelming majority of Afghanistan battlefield de­
tainees, Hamdi is silent, again because the case could be resolved 
without addressing the matter.  Consequently, the Government 
could, did, and, Hamdi notwithstanding, still does maintain that 
non-citizens captured outside the United States do not enjoy the 
same due process rights as do citizens.168 
163. Id. at 533 (majority opinion). 
164. Id. at 533, 539, 553. 
165. Id. at 534.  Souter disagreed, stating in his dissenting argument, “I do not 
mean to imply agreement that the Government could claim an evidentiary presumption 
casting the burden of rebuttal on Hamdi . . . .” Id. at 553-54 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Souter explicitly stated that he did not adopt the plurality resolution on the constitu­
tional issues he did not reach. Id. 
166. Id. at 533-34 (majority opinion). 
167. See id. at 533. 
168. See Ari Shapiro, Proposal Offers Specifics on Preventive Detention, NPR. 
ORG, (June 26, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105940019 
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Because Yaser Hamdi was an American citizen, the procedures 
established in his case to promote the fairness and accuracy of mili­
tary detention decisions quite likely represent the maximum appli­
cation of due process limitations to such decisions with respect to 
persons captured while fighting for the Taliban government in Af­
ghanistan.169  The Hamdi decision, relentlessly narrow once again, 
says nothing about how, if at all, the due process clause applies to 
the military detention of persons apprehended in locations other 
than Afghanistan or because of conduct they are believed to have 
engaged in away from that traditional battlefield setting. Whether 
or not citizens of the United States, persons who are neither mem­
bers of the military arm of a government with which the United 
States is at war nor captured in the territory of such a government 
are more likely than Afghanistan battlefield detainees, like Hamdi, 
to present plausible arguments that they are not combatants at all, 
but are instead civilians outside the lawful reach of military deten­
tion.  It is thus at least conceivable that if either the AUMF or the 
President’s Article II military power warrants the application of 
military force to such persons, the due process protections that ac­
company this application are more robust than those recognized in 
Hamdi.  And if these protections are greater for non-battlefield de­
tainees, the question of whether they extend to non-citizens cap­
tured outside the United States becomes even more salient. 
In sum, though the Hamdi decision does recognize a limited 
Presidential authority to carry out military detention under the 
AUMF and imposes limited due process restraints on the exercise 
of that authority, it is, in important ways, a decision whose prece­
dential force is restricted to its extremely unusual, particular facts. 
Obviously the vast majority of persons detained by the American 
military since September 11, 2001 have been citizens of nations 
other than the United States.  And many have been apprehended 
either in locations other than Afghanistan, or because of actions 
they are thought to have engaged in outside Afghanistan, or both. 
It is probably not surprising then, that there has never been, and 
may never be, a hearing convened under the Hamdi procedures. 
(stating that U.S. citizens would not be a part of the Obama administration’s detention 
system for terrorism detainees). 
169. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-35 (outlining minimum standards for citizen-de­
tainee proceedings). 
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B. Padilla 
Hamdi is the post 9-11 case that offers the most (however lim­
ited) insight into the military detention powers of the President. 
However, the litigation growing out of the detention of Jose Padilla 
was the most directly analogous to Al-Marri.170  Like Al-Marri, but 
unlike Hamdi, Padilla was initially arrested in the United States.171 
On May 8, 2002, Padilla was held as a material witness in connec­
tion with the grand jury investigation of the September 11 at­
tacks.172  A month later, President Bush issued an executive order 
designating him as an enemy combatant and ordering his indefinite 
military detention.173  As with the similar order for Al-Marri, the 
President candidly acknowledged that one of the reasons for Pa­
dilla’s detention without trial was his alleged possession of “intelli­
gence, . . . about personnel and activities of al Qaeda, that, if 
communicated to the U.S., would aid U.S. efforts to prevent attacks 
by al Qaeda on the United States or its armed forces, other govern­
mental personnel, or citizens.”174  Pursuant to the executive order, 
Padilla, like Al-Marri, was transported from Justice Department 
custody in New York to the Navy Brig in Charleston, South Caro­
lina where his indefinite, incommunicado detention commenced.175 
Padilla, like Hamdi, but unlike Al-Marri, was an American citi­
zen.176  On the other hand, again like Hamdi but unlike Al-Marri, 
Padilla’s sojourn and alleged activities in Afghanistan extended into 
the period following the American military invasion of that nation 
under the authority of the AUMF.177 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found, on 
the basis of reasoning similar to that of Justices Ginsburg and Sou­
ter in Hamdi, that the AUMF did not authorize Padilla’s military 
detention because it did not clearly overcome the prohibition of the 
1970 Non-Detention Act in the case of “an American citizen al­
ready held in a federal correctional institution and not ‘arrayed 
against our troops’ in the field of battle.”178  Nor, according to the 
Second Circuit, did the President have “inherent constitutional au­
170. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
171. Id. at 430. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, app. at 725 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 
426 (2004). 
175. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 432. 
176. Id. at 430. 
177. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2005). 
178. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 723. 
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thority as Commander-in-Chief to detain American citizens on 
American soil outside a zone of combat.”179 
The Supreme Court, by a vote of 5-4, reversed, without ad­
dressing the legality of Padilla’s military detention.180  Instead, the 
five Justices in the majority held that the only proper venue for 
Padilla’s challenge to that detention had been the federal district 
court in South Carolina, because the Charleston Navy Brig was lo­
cated in that state.181  Included in this majority was Justice Scalia, 
whose dissent in Hamdi was based on his stated conviction that the 
President has no authority, statutory or constitutional, to hold an 
American citizen in military detention without trial.182 
The four dissenting Justices joined an opinion by Justice Ste­
vens which found the Southern District of New York, and thus the 
Second Circuit, to have been proper venues for Padilla’s suit.183  On 
the merits, these four Justices agreed “that the Non-Detention Act, 
. . . prohibit[ed]—and the Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force Joint Resolution, . . . [did] not authorize—the protracted, in­
communicado detention of American citizens arrested in the 
United States.”184  Justice Stevens’s opinion added that 
unconstrained executive detention for the purpose of investigat­
ing and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star 
Chamber. . . . 
Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of 
enemy soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes 
be justified to prevent persons from launching or becoming mis­
siles of destruction.  It may not, however, be justified by the na­
ked interest in using unlawful procedures to extract information. 
Incommunicado detention for months on end is such a 
procedure.185 
Justice Breyer, who was one of the four Justices in the Hamdi 
plurality, fully joined Justice Stevens’s dissent in Padilla.186  It may 
be safe to infer, therefore, that in 2004, when the two cases were 
decided, at least five Justices, the four Hamdi dissenters plus Justice 
179. Id. at 712. 
180. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 451.  “But it is surely just as necessary in important 
cases as in unimportant ones that courts take care not to exceed their ‘respective juris­
dictions’ established by Congress.” Id. at 450-51. 
181. Id. at 446-47, 451. 
182. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554, 577 (2004). 
183. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
184. Id. at 464 n.8. 
185. Id. at 465. 
186. Id. at 455. 
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Breyer, believed Padilla’s detention to be unlawful.  It is even more 
likely that at least seven, the four members of the Hamdi plurality, 
plus the three Padilla dissenters, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Souter, who were not members of that plurality, agreed with Justice 
O’Connor’s view “that indefinite detention for the purpose of inter­
rogation is not authorized.”187  And yet, in neither case were there 
more than four votes cast for either of these propositions.  And four 
being one less than five, the Executive Branch remained free, after 
Hamdi and Padilla, plausibly to assert the power to hold American 
citizens, arrested on American soil, in indefinite military detention, 
without trial, for the purpose of interrogating them. 
The proceedings on remand in Padilla amounted, in some 
ways, to a rehearsal for the Supreme Court’s disposition of Al­
Marri’s appeal.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
reversing a judgment of the U. S. District Court for South Carolina 
ordering Padilla’s release, sustained the President’s power to detain 
Padilla under the AUMF, holding that “[l]ike Hamdi, Padilla asso­
ciated with forces hostile to the United States in Afghanistan . . . 
[a]nd . . . took up arms against United States forces in that coun­
try.”188  The contrast between Padilla’s subsequent arrest on Amer­
ican soil and Hamdi’s capture on a foreign battlefield was irrelevant 
because Padilla’s detention, to prevent his return to the Afghan 
battlefield, was no less necessary than Hamdi’s had been. 
Padilla’s lawyers petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari.189  Two days before the government’s brief in opposition 
was due, and after nearly three and one-half years of holding him in 
military detention at the Charleston Brig, the government an­
nounced Padilla’s indictment on criminal charges and moved the 
Fourth Circuit to authorize his transfer from military to Justice De­
partment custody.190  The Fourth Circuit denied the motion, sug­
gesting that the government’s apparently strategically motivated 
actions left 
the impression that Padilla may have been held for these years 
. . . . by mistake . . . [and] that the principle [of military detention 
without trial] . . . can, in the end, yield to expediency. . . . [T]hese 
impressions have been left, we fear, at what may ultimately prove 
to be substantial cost to the government’s credibility before the 
187. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521. 
188. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2005). 
189. Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006). 
190. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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courts. . . .  While there could be an objective that could com­
mand such a price as all of this, it is difficult to imagine what that 
objective would be.191 
The Supreme Court quickly reversed this decision, granted the 
government’s motion, and dismissed Padilla’s petition for certiorari 
as moot.192  Padilla was subsequently convicted of the charges 
against him and sentenced to prison for a term of seventeen years, a 
term that he is now serving.193 
C. Rasul & Boumediene 
The limited resolution offered by the Hamdi and Padilla cases 
to the questions raised by executive detention without trial is, as 
suggested above, narrowed even further by the fact that the detain­
ees in both cases were American citizens.  It is possible that the 
Justices’ opinions in these cases are largely irrelevant to the fates of 
hundreds, or perhaps possibly thousands, of non-citizens held with­
out trial in American military custody at various sites, known and 
unknown, around the world.  It is unlikely, of course, that the Presi­
dent could have less power to detain non-citizens than otherwise 
similarly situated citizens of the United States.  And it is almost im­
possible to imagine that non-citizens falling within the President’s 
detention power could ever enjoy more rights under the due pro­
cess clause than do citizens detained under analogous circum­
stances.  But, beyond these truisms, any insight from the Supreme 
Court on the scope and limits of presidential power to hold non­
citizens in military detention must be drawn from those remaining 
post September 11 cases in which non-citizens challenged their 
treatment by the Bush Administration. 
The plaintiffs in two of these cases, Rasul v. Bush,194 decided 
along with Hamdi and Padilla on June 28, 2004, and Boumediene v. 
Bush,195 decided four years later, were detainees held at the Ameri­
can Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Both sets of plaintiffs 
claimed that they were never engaged in military combat against 
the United States and thus could not lawfully be held in indefinite 
191. Id. at 587. 
192. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1649, 1650 (2007). 
193. Peter Whoriskey & Dan Eggen, Judge Sentences Padilla to 17 Years, Cites 
His Detention, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2008/01/22/AR2008012200565.html. 
194. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
195. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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military detention.196  And, in both cases, the detainees further ar­
gued that their detention and treatment while in detention violated 
rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution.197 
Because the plaintiffs in Rasul and Boumediene were appre­
hended outside Afghanistan, their challenges presented the ques­
tion whether, and perhaps to what extent, the war powers conferred 
by the AUMF or Article II extended beyond that traditional thea­
tre of war.198  Because they challenged their treatment while in 
American military detention, their suits also tested, at least poten­
tially, the strength of Justice O’Connor’s observation in Hamdi that 
“indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not author­
ized.”199  And, of course, because the Rasul and Boumediene plain­
tiffs were not American citizens and were held at a location outside 
the formal legal sovereignty of the United States, adjudication of 
their Fifth Amendment claims required resolution of whether and 
to what extent they enjoyed the protection of the limitations on 
government conduct that amendment enforces.  Resolution of this 
last question would quite likely also establish the minimum due 
process rights available to any non-citizen detainees apprehended 
as combatants or held in military detention within American sover­
eign territory, since any argument against the application of consti­
tutional protections could only be weaker as to detainees with these 
connections to the United States. 
The Supreme Court’s dispositions of Rasul and Boumediene 
did not purport to resolve, or even address, any of these issues. The 
reason, in both cases, was uncertainty about the question that is 
most basic to the exercise of federal judicial power in the American 
constitutional system: whether a federal court can exercise jurisdic­
tion over the case.200  In Rasul and Boumediene (as in Hamdi and 
Padilla as well, without controversy) the plaintiffs sought to litigate 
their claims by seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the venerable com­
mon law vehicle, specifically preserved in Article I, Section 9 of the 
Constitution, for challenging the legality of executive detention.201 
196. Id. at 734; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471-72. 
197. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15; Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007). 
198. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734 (acknowledging that where the petitioners 
were detained ranged from Afghanistan to Bosnia and Gambia); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471­
72 (petitioners were from Australia and Kuwait). 
199. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004). 
200. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 736; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 472 . 
201. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 472. 
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In both cases, the government argued that the writ was unavailable 
to non-citizens detained at Guantanamo Bay.202 
1. Rasul and the CSRT Process 
In Rasul, once again by the narrowest 5-4 margin, the Court 
rejected the government’s argument, holding that the federal stat­
ute conferring subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts over 
habeas corpus petitions did apply to petitions filed by Guantanamo 
detainees, because the naval base, even if not technically under 
American sovereignty, was part of the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.203  The Court’s opinion resolved no other issues. Its 
judgment simply remanded the case for further proceedings in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.204 
In the aftermath of Rasul, the Bush Administration main­
tained—plausibly in light of the Court’s decision—that even though 
the Guantanamo detainees enjoyed a statutory right to file habeas 
corpus petitions, they nonetheless held no rights, as non-citizens 
held at Guantanamo Bay, under the Constitution which a habeas 
court could enforce.205  The merits of Guantanamo detainees’ chal­
lenge to the legality of their military detention were thus still be­
yond the legitimate reach of the federal judicial power.206  This 
argument met with mixed success in the lower federal courts and 
still remains, as the discussion of Boumediene will show, largely 
unresolved. 
Despite its view that the Constitution had no application at the 
Guantanamo Naval Base, and thus perhaps as a matter of what it 
took to be executive grace, the Bush Administration quickly 
moved, on the heels of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdi 
and Rasul, to fashion a military hearing process of sorts to deter­
mine the legality of the detentions of persons held there. This pro­
cess established military panels called Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals (CSRTs) and charged them with deciding whether the 
202. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 472-473 (arguing that 
aliens detained outside the sovereign territory of the U.S. cannot invoke habeas 
corpus). 
203. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471, 484. 
204. Id. at 485. 
205. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753 (characterizing the government’s view of the 
constitutional reach of habeas corpus as limited to the areas in which the United States 
has sovereign control, and because the government has formally recognized Cuba as 
having sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay the courts would be constrained from enforc­
ing the Constitution there). 
206. Id. at 765. 
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government had a sufficient basis to subject each detainee to indefi­
nite military imprisonment without trial.207  The CSRT’s rules, 
modeled loosely on the procedures fashioned by Justice 
O’Connor’s Hamdi plurality opinion, adopted that opinion’s au­
thorization of the admission of all evidence offered by the govern­
ment, notwithstanding hearsay or confrontation clause objections, 
and its approval of a presumption that all such evidence was true.208 
The CSRT system, however, did not require the government to dis­
close the basis for its conclusion that a detainee was a combatant 
against the United States, or the evidence supporting that conclu­
sion, to the detainee, if either had been classified.209  Nor was a 
detainee permitted to be represented by counsel at a CSRT hear­
ing.210  The definition of enemy combatant employed at CSRT 
hearings included any persons who have “engaged in hostilities” or 
who have “materially supported hostilities against the United 
States.”211  This definition, obviously far broader than the one rec­
ognized by the Supreme Court in Hamdi, is notable for its complete 
absence of either temporal or geographical limits, or constraints 
based on whether an alleged combatant is a member of a military 
force or a civilian. 
Not surprisingly, the CSRT process sustained the propriety of 
nearly every Guantanamo Bay detention.212  Nevertheless, by 2008 
many Guantanamo Bay detainees had been released voluntarily by 
the government on the ground that they were “no longer enemy 
combatants,” a determination which depends on the government’s 
having satisfied itself that a detainee no longer had intelligence in­
formation useful to the United States.213 
207. Id. at 733-34. 
208. See id. at 734, 784. 
209. See id. at 783-84. 
210. Id. at 767. 
211. See Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (A) (1)(i) (2006). 
212. See DEP’T OF  DEF., FACT  SHEET  GUANTANAMO  DETAINEES BY THE  NUM­
BERS 1 (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2005/d20050831sheet.pdf 
(noting that 558 CSRTs were conducted, but only thirty-eight of them resulted in a 
finding that the individual was no longer an enemy combatant). 
213. See Thomas Bogar, Unlawful Combatant or Innocent Civilian? A Call to 
Change the Current Means for Determining the Status of Prisoners in the Global War on 
Terror, 21 FLA. J. INT’L. L. 29, 90 (2009). 
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2.	 Boumediene and the Constitutionalization of Habeas 
Corpus Rights at Guantanamo 
In 2006, Congress sought to overrule the Supreme Court’s de­
cision in Rasul by enacting the Military Commissions Act (MCA)214 
The MCA included a provision amending the habeas corpus juris­
dictional statute, relied on by the Rasul majority, to preclude the 
federal courts from entertaining habeas corpus petitions filed by 
persons detained at Guantanamo Bay, including those petitions al­
ready pending at the time of its enactment.215  The plaintiffs in 
Boumediene v. Bush were Guantanamo detainees with pending 
habeas petitions authorized by Rasul.216  They argued that the 
MCA’s jurisdiction stripping measure was an unlawful attempt by 
Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus without satisfying 
the requirements for such a suspension specified in Article I, Sec­
tion 9 of the Constitution.217 
The Supreme Court, yet again by a 5-4 vote, agreed with the 
detainees.218  As in Rasul, the majority rejected the government’s 
argument that the habeas corpus right did not extend to non-citi­
zens held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.219  This time, 
though, without a jurisdictional statute to rely on, the Court’s deter­
mination was based on the conclusion that the common law writ of 
habeas corpus, protected from suspension by Article I, Section 9, 
was available to Guantanamo detainees because the Naval base was 
under the complete, total, and indefinite control of the United 
States government.220  As such, the writ could not be suspended, as 
the MCA jurisdictional bar purported to do, without a finding by 
Congress that the invasion or rebellion prerequisites for such sus­
pension were satisfied.221  The Boumediene majority then went on 
to hold that the CSRT process, which had been ratified and made 
subject to limited appellate review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit by Congress, was an inadequate substitute for a 
hearing on a habeas corpus petition conducted as an original matter 
214. See Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1). 
215. See id. § 2241(e)(2). 
216. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 734 (2008). 
217. Id. at 732-33. 
218. Id. at 733. 
219. Id. at 771 (“We hold that Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect 
at Guantanamo Bay.”). 
220. Id. at 768 (“Unlike its present control [of Guantanamo Bay] the United 
States’ control over the prison in Germany was neither absolute nor indefinite.”). 
221. Id. at 743, 771. 
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by a United States district court.222  A habeas hearing, the majority 
ruled, must offer an opportunity to challenge the government’s evi­
dence in an Article III court and to have that court admit and con­
sider relevant exculpatory evidence not introduced at any prior 
military hearing.223  Because the CSRT system did neither, it was 
constitutionally insufficient.224 
As in Rasul, the Boumediene majority opinion, written by Jus­
tice Kennedy, was narrow, deciding only that habeas corpus review 
was available to the Guantanamo detainees and sketching some 
minimal requirements of such review.225  Notably, by relying solely 
on the common law roots of the habeas writ and the protection of 
the writ by the original, pre-Bill of Rights, Constitution, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion appeared to preserve yet again the question, left 
open in Rasul, whether the detainees also enjoyed any of the guar­
antees provided by the first nine amendments.226  The opinion thus 
did not address the relationship, if any, between the habeas corpus 
right to Article III judicial review of the legality of their detention, 
established by Boumediene for non-citizens held outside sovereign 
American territory, and the apparently much more limited Hamdi 
military hearing rights available to American citizens held as enemy 
combatants in the United States. This apparent paradox provided 
an important premise for Chief Justice Roberts’s Boumediene dis­
sent.  Roberts argued that the CSRT procedures, which he believed 
satisfy any constitutional process due the Guantanamo detainees, 
must, for that reason, also meet the minimum conditions for a 
habeas corpus hearing.227 
Perhaps because of this latent tension with Hamdi and the 
CSRT procedures, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene of­
fered little guidance to the district courts as to the standards to use 
in making detention decisions or on the appropriate procedures for 
the conduct of habeas hearings.  As a consequence, the habeas 
222. Id. at 729. 
223. Id. at 786. 
If a detainee can present reasonably available evidence demonstrating there is 
no basis for his continued detention, he must have the opportunity to present 
this evidence to a habeas corpus court . . . . [This evidence] would be inadmis­
sible in a DTA review proceeding. The role of an Article III court in the exer­
cise of its habeas corpus function cannot be circumscribed in this manner. 
Id. at 790. 
224. Id. at 790-92. 
225. Id. at 798. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 804 (Roberts, J. dissenting). 
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corpus proceedings convened by the judges of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia under Boumediene have varied 
greatly.228  By March of 2011, these judges had completed habeas 
corpus proceedings for fifty-nine men held at Guantanamo.229  In 
twenty-one of these proceedings, the evidence offered by the gov­
ernment was found to be sufficient to justify continued indefinite 
military detention.230  In the other thirty-eight cases the judges or­
dered the release of the detainee, the first court-ordered releases 
since September 11, though the government continues to hold at 
least seventeen of these prisoners at Guantanamo pending further 
appeals.231 
For purposes of the primary rule of law values of consistency 
and even-handedness, what is more striking than the government’s 
fairly dismal record at these hearings is the variation in the defini­
tions, procedures, and rules of evidence employed by the judges 
who have conducted them.  The standards for determining the gov­
ernment’s power to hold a person in indefinite military detention 
have ranged from a requirement of “membership in ‘the armed 
forces of an enemy organization’”232 (parallel to the definition ap­
proved in Hamdi, with the significant substitution of “organization” 
for nation) at one pole, to evidence of mere provision, at any time 
or place, of substantial support for “Taliban or Al Qaeda forces or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilites against the United 
States,” at the other.233  Though the judges have routinely consid­
ered hearsay evidence and have been willing to protect information 
viewed by the government as secret from disclosure to detainees, 
news reports have suggested that judges have differed significantly 
in assessing the weight to be given materials not subjected to the 
228. Chisun Lee, Their Own Private Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, July 22 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/opinion/23lee.html (noting that the lack of uniform­
ity of analysis of the post-Boumediene detention cases). 
229. Guantanamo Timeline: Captives Sue For Release, MIAMI  HERALD (Sept. 7, 
2009), http://www.miamiherald.com/2009/09/03/1216218/guantanamo-timeline-captives­
sue.html. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Lee, supra note 228 (quoting Judge Reggie Walton’s definition of “substan- R 
tial support”). 
233. Id. (stating that an individual who cooked meals for the Taliban provided 
sufficient support to justify his detention); see also Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 
722 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that the Government “now claims the authority to 
detain” these individuals). 
733 
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rigorous testing that would be demanded in a criminal trial.234  The 
absence of uniform standards has, in sum, required each judge to 
fashion his or her own ad hoc rules for habeas corpus hearings, with 
attendant costs to the perception, and perhaps the reality, of fair­
ness and accuracy.235 
D. Hamdan 
Of the Supreme Court’s five significant post-September 11 
cases bearing on the President’s military detention powers, 
Hamdan, decided in 2006, is the least relevant to the scope and lim­
its of these powers.236  The Court’s decision in Hamdan did not di­
rectly address any aspect of executive authority to hold alleged 
combatants without trial.237  Instead, the Court determined that the 
military commission charged with trying Hamdan was unlawful be­
cause it was inconsistent with both Congress’s standards for military 
commissions and the requirements of international law, as adopted 
and enforced by Congress.238 
In arriving at the second of these conclusions, Justice Stevens’s 
opinion for the 5-4 divided Court determined that the conflict be­
tween the United States and al-Qaeda was “not of an international 
234. Id. (noting the lack of uniformity of analysis of the post-Boumediene deten­
tion cases and contrasting the burden of proof applied by judges as “far lower . . . than 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’” and recognizing that “judges have . . . admitted hearsay 
evidence, and . . . sealed courtrooms to protect government secrecy”). 
235. One district judge has read Boumediene to require application of the Sus­
pension Clause to habeas corpus petitions presented by foreign national detainees cap­
tured outside Afghanistan but held at the Bagram Air Base internment facility 
maintained by the United States in that country.  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 
205, 235 (D. D.C. 2009), overruled by Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 
2010).  His decision rested on findings that the United States had firm control over the 
facility, id. at 226, that aliens detained there received less process than those detained at 
Guantanamo Bay, id. at 227, that any practical obstacles to managing habeas proceeed­
ings for Bagram detainees could be overcome, id. at 231, and that, though imprisoned in 
a war zone, the detainees had not been captured on the Afghan battlefield, id.  This 
decision, however, has been reversed by a panel of the D.C. Circuit, which distinguished 
the Bagram base from Guantanamo on the ground that it lay within a war zone. Al 
Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97-99. 
236. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
237. See id. at 635 (“It bears emphasizing that . . . we do not today address[ ] the 
Government’s power to detain [Hamdan] for the duration of active hostilities in order 
to prevent such harm.”). 
238. Id. at 567.  In 2001, the Bush Administration created the system of military 
commissions to try persons charged by the United States with war crimes “as a tough-
minded alternative to the civilian trials that the Clinton administration had used against 
terrorists.”  Charles Lane, High Court Rejects Detainee Tribunals: 5 to 3 Ruling Curbs 
President’s Claim of Wartime Power, WASH. POST, June 30, 2006, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/29/AR2006062900928.html. 
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character” for purposes of the application of the Geneva Conven­
tions.239  This determination may limit the President’s ability to rely 
on those Conventions as a source of authority to detain persons 
captured in that conflict as combatants.  But if this is so, the power 
to hold persons apprehended in a non-international conflict de­
faults to the governing law of the detaining nation.240  And it is, of 
course, the requirements of that law, the Constitution of the United 
States, and statutes enacted under its authority that drew the focus, 
however limited, of the Justices’ attention in Hamdi, Padilla, Rasul, 
and Boumediene. 
E. Summary 
The lessons to be taken from eight years of litigation, and five 
significant Supreme Court decisions, addressing the President’s 
treatment of persons captured in the armed conflicts following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, are not unimportant.  But because of 
the Supreme Court’s commitment to the passive virtues of narrow 
resolution on narrow grounds, these lessons are quite limited. We 
know, unsurprisingly, from Hamdi that the war-making power con­
ferred by Congress in the AUMF authorizes the President to detain 
members of the Afghanistan military forces captured by the United 
States on the traditional battlefield, as that country became after 
the fall 2001 American invasion.241  We know, also from Hamdi, 
that the very small number of American citizens falling within this 
authorization enjoy limited due process rights to challenge their 
designation as combatants before a military tribunal.242  And, prob­
ably most significantly, we know from Boumediene that non-citi­
zens held in military prison at the American Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, enjoy access to the writ of habeas corpus 
(also held, of course, by American citizens and lawful resident 
aliens detained in the United States) to challenge the legality of 
their detention, though we do not know very much about what that 
access entails, especially whether it includes the ability to claim pro­
239. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629-31. 
240. Id. at 632 (defining a “‘regularly constituted court’ as used in Common Arti­
cle 3 to mean ‘established and organised [sic] in accordance with the laws and proce­
dures already in force in a country’” (citations omitted)). 
241. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004); see supra notes 146, 148-150 R 
and accompanying text. 
242. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533; see supra notes 163-169 and accompanying text. R 
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tection by some or all of the guarantees assured by the Bill of 
Rights.243 
The many other important questions about the scope and limits 
of the President’s military detention power remain largely unad­
dressed by the Court’s decisions.244  Perhaps the most important of 
these are (a) whether, and to what extent, there are geographical or 
temporal restraints on the lawful exercise of this power; (b) 
whether there is a definition that limits the categories of persons 
who might be subject to military detention; (c) what constitutionally 
mandated procedures, if any, constrain the President’s power to de­
tain persons on the basis of their alleged activities outside the tradi­
tionally defined field of battle in Afghanistan; (d) whether persons 
residing lawfully in the United States, including both citizens and 
non-citizens, are subject to military detention; and (e) whether, and 
in what ways, the President may lawfully interrogate persons held 
in military custody.  On these, and perhaps other questions, both 
the President and the lawyers and organizations who represent de­
tainees, can still plausibly assert just about any position. 
In order to resolve the questions presented by Al-Marri’s peti­
tion for certiorari, which the Court had agreed to hear, the Justices 
would almost certainly have been required to shed significant light 
on some, or maybe all, of these issues.  Because Al-Marri’s deten­
tion was based, in significant part, on his alleged conduct outside 
Afghanistan prior to September 11,245 his petition necessarily ad­
243. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008); see supra notes 219-223 and R 
accompanying text. 
244. The first of the post-Boumediene habeas cases to reach the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concerned a citizen of Yemen, detained in Guantanamo 
after being apprehended in Afghanistan by Northern Alliance forces in late 2001 while 
he was serving as a cook for a paramilitary brigade engaged in combat against the 
United States.  Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, in light of the similarity between the circumstances of his capture and 
Yaser Hamdi’s, the court of appeals held both that Al-Bihani’s military detention was 
lawful under the AUMF and that Boumediene did not require that Al-Bihani be af­
forded greater due process protections than those applicable to Hamdi’s detention. Id. 
at 875-77.  The opinion of the court by Judge Brown implied that Al-Bihani might not 
have been entitled even to the Hamdi procedures, noting that “the procedures to which 
Americans are entitled are likely greater than the procedures to which non-citizens 
seized abroad during the war on terror are entitled.” Id. at 877 n.3.  In a separate 
concurring opinion, Judge Brown also declared that the situation presented by habeas 
corpus petitions conducted under the authority of Boumediene is “particularly ripe for 
Congress to intervene pursuant to its policy expertise, democratic legitimacy, and oath 
to uphold and defend the Constitution.” Id. at 882 (Brown, J., concurring). 
245. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc sub 
nom. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (listing alleged 
conduct supporting the Government’s detention of Al-Marri); Michael Isikoff, A Terror 
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dressed the limits imposed by time, location, and due process on the 
President’s war power in a situation significantly different from that 
presented by Hamdi.246  Al-Marri was also a non-citizen residing 
lawfully in the United States when he was apprehended, had never 
been a member of the armed forces of an enemy government, and 
was subjected to military detention, at least in significant part, in 
order to subject him to interrogation.247  Determining the lawful­
ness of his detention under these circumstances would likely have 
required the Court also to address the standards for determining 
who may be subjected to military detention, the permissible goals 
of such detention, and the extent to which power of military deten­
tion can be applied to persons arrested on American soil. 
Eight years after September 11, light from the Supreme Court 
on these issues would have been welcome.  It goes without saying 
that the power of the executive branch to apply force and violence 
against anyone it chooses is enormous. To date, both Presidential 
Administrations that have held power since the events of Septem­
ber 11 have, perhaps understandably, sought to maximize their abil­
ity to use that power against those they perceive to be the nation’s 
enemies.  To the extent that American law imposes restraints on the 
President’s authority to detain persons he deems to be enemy com­
batants without trial, it is past time for the judicial branch, which 
has the power and duty “to say what the law is,”248 to announce 
what these restraints are.  For this reason, unless somehow required 
by the Court’s precedents, including those precedents standing for 
the passive virtues of judicial restraint, the Court’s decision to dis­
miss the Al-Marri petition as moot was deeply unfortunate. 
III.	 MOOTNESS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE COURT’S 
FAILURES IN AL-MARRI 
A. The Purposes of Judicial Review 
The American practice of judicial review serves at least two, 
and possibly three, distinct purposes.  The first and least controver­
sial of these is to perform the common law function of providing 
remedies to persons who have been, or are about to be, injured by 
government action that violates the Constitution.  It is this essential 
Suspect in the Dock, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/03/17/ 
a-terror-suspect-in-the-dock.html. 
246. See supra Part II.A-C. 
247. Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 164-66; see supra Part I.A-C. 
248. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
737 
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function that grounds Chief Justice Marshall’s affirmation in the 
first part of Marbury v. Madison, that “[t]he very essence of civil 
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.  One of the 
first duties of government is to afford that protection.”249  For Mar­
shall, it was because “court[s] of justice” were charged with carrying 
out this duty that they could properly examine the legality of the act 
of an executive branch officer, including even the head of any de­
partment of that branch.250 
This justification for judicial review is reflected in the limita­
tion of the federal judicial power by Article III of the Constitution 
to the resolution of cases and controversies.251  And it is this limita­
tion which in turn provides the premise for the Supreme Court’s 
development of standing to sue doctrine, which requires that a 
plaintiff suffer a remediable injury at the hands of the defendant as 
a precondition to seeking adjudication of her or his legal claims 
against that defendant.252  In constitutional cases, especially, this re­
quirement adopts a posture of judicial modesty by explaining the 
elevation of judicial power over that of the executive or Congress as 
a matter of sheer necessity, as opposed to interpretive superiority. 
When tethered to the traditional function of providing a remedy for 
an unlawfully inflicted injury, a court’s decision to invalidate the 
actions of one of these branches can be seen as a byproduct of the 
exercise of the core judicial function, rather than the core function 
itself. 
The second, more controversial purpose of judicial review is to 
implement Marshall’s justly famous claim that it is “the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”253  To 
249. Id. at 163. 
250. Id. at 165-66. 
251. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
252. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
253. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.  For a thorough examination of this inter­
pretation, see William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 
DUKE L. J. 1; Gerald Gunther, “The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues”—A Comment 
on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964); Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1959).  Contrary authorities assert that the other participants in the government have a 
role in interpreting the Constitution. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE  PEOPLE  THEM­
SELVES: POPULAR  CONSTITUTIONALISM AND  JUDICIAL  REVIEW  248 (2004) (rejecting 
judicial review as the sovereign interpretation of constitutional law); see also MARK 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).  Others advo­
cated the control of the federal courts through either curtailing their jurisdiction, see 
Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to 
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the extent it provides independent justification for the exercise of 
judicial power beyond that afforded by its necessary place in the 
dispensation of remedies, this claim entails an obligation by the 
President and Congress not just to obey the orders of courts in par­
ticular cases, but also to adhere to the principles declared by courts, 
especially the Supreme Court, in carrying out their own constitu­
tional powers and responsibilities.  Such an obligation does depend 
on the superiority of the courts over other branches in determining 
what the Constitution authorizes, requires, and prohibits. This is, of 
course, a plausible assertion, albeit one that continues to draw con­
siderable and forceful opposition. 
Controversial or not, however, the conduct of most recent 
Presidents has shown considerable acquiescence to the oracular, 
law-declaring function of Supreme Court decisions.  Even the Ad­
ministration of President George W. Bush, whose strategy in the 
terrorism cases reviewed in the previous section was to maximize 
the scope of unchecked executive power, treated the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in these cases as announcing rules and principles 
of generally applicable law and shaped its post-litigation conduct to 
what it understood to be the likely requirements of that law.254 
The Bush Administration’s responses to the Hamdi, Rasul, and 
Hamdan cases are instructive.  Despite the Supreme Court’s elabo­
ration, in Hamdi, of the due process rights of American citizens 
only, and the Court’s explicit decision, in Rasul, not to address the 
question of whether the due process clause applied at all to Guanta­
namo detainees, the Bush Administration nevertheless immediately 
responded to these decisions by establishing the CSRT system at 
Guantanamo.255 
Further, the Administration plainly saw itself as bound to ap­
ply the Court’s interpretations of federal statutes in both Rasul and 
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 17 (1982), or 
encouraging use of judicial norms to curtail expansive judicial review, see Bickel, supra 
note 32, at 49-79 (arguing that the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over R 
some cases and providing a series of factors which may be taken into account in deter­
mining whether or not to grant certiorari). 
254. See supra Part II.A-E. 
255. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Combatant Status Review Tribunal Order Issued (2004), 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7530; see also Memorandum 
from the Deputy Secretary of Defense on Order Establishing Combatant Statute Re­
view Tribunal to the Secretary of the Navy 1-4 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www. 
defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; Guantanamo Bay Timeline, WASH. 
POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/timeline (last visited Mar. 31, 
2011) (showing that CSRTs were initiated for detainees on August 13, 2004, less than 
two months after the Supreme Court ruled in Rasul). 
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Hamdan in similar situations.  After the Rasul majority read the 
habeas corpus jurisdictional statute to apply to petitions filed from 
Guantanamo, the Administration acquiesced in the right of Guan­
tanamo detainees with retained counsel to be represented by such 
counsel for the purpose of pursuing such petitions.256  Similarly, af­
ter the Court’s decision in Hamdan that the military commission 
scheme established by the President was inconsistent with federal 
statutory requirements, the Bush Administration immediately sus­
pended its use of these tribunals entirely, rather than simply calling 
off Hamdan’s trial but persisting in using the tribunals to prosecute 
other cases.  And, most tellingly, since both Rasul and Hamdan 
were based on the Supreme Court’s reading of federal statutes, the 
Administration did not respond to either decision by continuing to 
urge or apply its own, rejected interpretations of these statutes. 
Instead, the Bush Administration went to Congress to seek the 
prospective reversal of both decisions by statutory amendment in 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006.257  None of this is to suggest 
that the Administration’s responses to these cases were correct, 
praiseworthy or generous, much less surprising, or even worthy of 
much note.  The point of reprising these responses is rather to show 
that the law-announcing—as opposed to just dispute resolving— 
function of judicial review is sufficiently embedded in American le­
gal culture to have been largely accepted even by a President who 
was, perhaps, most likely to have resisted it. 
The third possible purpose of judicial review is to limit the ex­
ercise of executive power.258  This goal may be no more than a co­
rollary of the previous two, without any independent justificatory 
force.  Whatever independent weight this third function may pro­
vide, however, applies uniquely in habeas corpus cases.  Limiting 
executive power appears to supply a premise for Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion for the Court in Boumediene.259  Justice Kennedy was care­
ful to decide that the privilege of habeas corpus, protected from 
256. Guantanamo Bay Timeline, supra note 255 (On August 30, 2004, “the first R 
civilian attorney [is able] to meet with detainees at Guantanamo.”). 
257. See id. (On September 28, 2006, approximately three months after the 
Court’s ruling in Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commission Act.); John Cer­
one, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Examining the Relationship between the 
International Law of Armed Conflict and US Law, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Nov. 13, 
2006), http://www.asil.org/insights061114.cfm#_ednref4. 
258. See AZIZ Z. HUQ, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, TWELVE STEPS TO RE­
STORE  CHECKS AND  BALANCES 11-13 (2008), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/ 
543341179e6a856b9b_9um6batcl.pdf. 
259. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744 (2008). 
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suspension by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, is in force at 
the Guantanamo Naval Base, without passing on whether non-citi­
zens held there enjoy the protection of the Bill of Rights as well.260 
Perhaps for this reason, his opinion sought to explain the role of the 
great writ in restraining the conduct of the Executive Branch even 
on behalf of persons who may enjoy no rights under American law. 
Justice Kennedy’s answer to this paradox was to anchor the writ in 
the principle of separation of powers: 
The Framers’ inherent distrust of governmental power was the 
driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers 
among three independent branches.  This design serves not only 
to make Government accountable but also to secure individual 
liberty.  Because the Constitution’s separation-of-powers struc­
ture . . . protects persons as well as citizens, foreign nationals who 
have the privilege of litigating in our courts can seek to enforce 
separation-of-powers principles. . . . 
[The habeas clause] ensures that, except during periods of formal 
suspension, the Judiciary will have a time tested device, the writ, 
to maintain the “delicate balance of governance” that is itself the 
surest safeguard of liberty.261 
This argument, to the extent it disaggregates the justification 
for judicial review, at least in habeas corpus cases, from the protec­
tion of other legal rights of injured plaintiffs and the authority of 
the courts to articulate the content of constitutional requirements 
generally, appears to rest on an independent need to curb the abuse 
of executive power.262  “The Clause,” Justice Kennedy concluded, 
“protects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and au­
thority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account.”263  If this duty 
and authority provides a third rationale for the exercise of judicial 
review, it has special salience with respect to the President’s power 
to hold persons in indefinite military detention without trial.264 
260. Id. at 739.  “First, protection for the privilege of habeas corpus was one of 
the few safeguards of liberty specified in a Constitution that, at the outset, had no Bill 
of Rights.” Id.  Kennedy further expressed that “[w]e hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the 
Constitution,” and not the Bill of Rights, “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.” Id. at 
771. 
261. Id. at 742-43, 745 (citations omitted). 
262. Id. at 745-46. 
263. Id. at 745. 
264. Id. at 797 (“Within the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few 
exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear 
challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a person.”). 
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B. Mootness as a Passive Virtue 
The Supreme Court’s mootness doctrine seeks to minimize the 
inherent challenge posed by judicial review to the prerogatives of 
the other branches by limiting the occasions for review to those sit­
uations where its exercise is most necessary and thus most justifia­
ble.265  The mootness doctrine serves judicial restraint by 
withdrawing a plaintiff’s ability to continue litigating a case (nearly 
always one seeking some form of declaratory and or injunctive re­
lief) if the conduct by the defendant that prompted the litigation 
ends before its legality is adjudicated.266  A court’s dismissal of a 
case on the ground that it has become moot is thus a corollary of a 
judgment, made at the outset of a case, that the plaintiff lacks 
standing to sue.267  In order to have standing to sue for an injunc­
tion, a plaintiff must be suffering an injury at the hands of the de­
fendant that is susceptible of judicial remediation.  If that injury 
abates, regardless of the reason, before the litigation ends, judicial 
remediation is deemed no longer necessary.268  As Professor Henry 
Monaghan put it, mootness is “standing set in a time frame: The 
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of 
the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence 
(mootness).”269 
Mootness joins a passel of similarly crafted tools of judicial re­
straint, such as ripeness, abstention, and the prudential applications 
of the standing and political question doctrines, that allow the Su­
preme Court substantial leeway to control the context and timing of 
its exercise of judicial review.  In his justly renowned essay, now 
265. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 
82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1383-86 (1973) (defending the mootness doctrine and the exceptions 
to it as serving the Supreme Court’s “special function” as final arbiter of the meaning of 
the Constitution by assuring that constitutional issues are addressed and resolved in 
proper context); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public 
Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1984) 
(defending mootness and its exceptions as focusing adjudication on the protection of 
rights actually in danger while avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisionmaking); 
Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 603, 656 (1992) (arguing that the prudential character of mootness and 
the mootness exceptions are an effective way of assuring that the decisions of the Su­
preme Court give “true and concrete meaning to public values”). 
266. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the 
“Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 299 (1979) (describing the 
doctrine of mootness). 
267. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). 
268. See Monaghan, supra note 265, at 1383 (urging that the court should not R 
“waste” its resources on cases in which “‘nothing’ is at stake”). 
269. See id. at 1384. 
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nearly fifty years old, and in his subsequently equally famous book, 
The Least Dangerous Branch, Professor Alexander Bickel coined 
the enduring phrase, “the passive virtues” to categorize and cele­
brate these tools.270  For Bickel, the exercise of judicial review was 
less a duty owed by the courts, either to an injured litigant or to the 
American polity as a whole, than a problematic but essential asser­
tion of power.271  To be seen as legitimate, Bickel argued, this 
power should be deployed only with abiding regard both for the 
legitimate exercise of political authority by the elected branches 
and for the limits of judicial efficacy in the face of resistance by 
those branches.272  Judicial review, in Bickel’s view, must above all, 
rest on principle.273  If its exercise were mandatory, principle, he 
feared, would yield to expedient deference to excessive claims of 
power by the President and Congress, especially in times of great 
political stress or crisis.274  Only through the wise use of techniques 
that permitted the withholding of judgment in such times could the 
Supreme Court conserve its commitment to principled resolution of 
constitutional issues.275  Without the “passive virtues” the Court 
would be pressured to decide the merits of some cases, especially 
those of significant moment, in favor of the elected branches when 
a proper reading of the Constitution and laws required the opposite 
result.276 
C. Al-Marri and the Exceptions to Mootness 
Bickel’s warning about the limits of judicial authority in times 
of national crisis and political stress seems readily applicable to the 
period, still upon us in many ways, following the September 11, 
2001 attacks.  Certainly the Supreme Court’s carefully limited dis­
positions of the military detention cases it has resolved during this 
period reflect Bickle’s admonition of caution and restraint in the 
exercise of judicial power.  But if the Court’s exceedingly narrow 
rulings in these cases were warranted, its use of mootness to avoid 
resolving Al-Marri’s appeal was not. The Court’s decisions shaping 
270. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98, 128 (Yale University Press, 2d ed. 1986) (dis­
cussing the judiciary’s use of “techniques of avoiding adjudication” to “limit[ ] each 
year’s business to what nine men can fruitfully deal with”). 
271. See id. at 128-32. 
272. See id. at 192-97. 
273. Id. at 130-33. 
274. See id. at 131-32. 
275. See id. at 130-33, 187-89. 
276. See id. at 184-85. 
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the mootness doctrine since the time of Bickel’s essay have no 
doubt served the prudential purposes for which Bickel argued.  But 
these decisions have also refused to apply the doctrine in circum­
stances where the purposes of judicial review required its suspen­
sion.277  Nearly all of these circumstances applied to Al-Marri’s 
challenge to his military detention by the President. The Court’s 
refusal to decide the merits of this challenge thus claimed the pas­
sive virtues of mootness in a case where there was no virtue at all in 
the Court’s passivity.  The Court’s misuse of the mootness doctrine 
in Al-Marri thus undermined the more important value which, in 
Bickel’s view, justifies the passive virtues: the Supreme Court’s 
commitment to principled adjudication. 
Al-Marri’s case, to be sure, did technically become moot on 
February 27, 2009, when the Obama Administration ended his 
nearly six years in military detention and returned him to the civil­
ian custody of the Justice Department to face a second criminal 
prosecution.278  Nevertheless, two of the exceptions to mootness 
dismissal fashioned by the Supreme Court required the Court to 
keep his appeal on its docket.279  And a third consideration, never 
formally adopted by the Court as an exception to mootness, but 
urged persuasively by Chief Justice Rehnquist two decades ago, 
should also have prompted the Justices to resolve the important 
questions presented by Al-Marri’s military detention without 
trial.280 
1. Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review 
The first mootness exception excludes from dismissal those 
cases in which a plaintiff’s initial suit seeks relief from injuries 
which are capable of repetition, yet evading review.281  This excep­
tion is quite narrow, perhaps narrower than its label might imply, 
because it applies only when the plaintiff whose claim has become 
moot faces a reasonable expectation of being injured again by the 
same defendant under the same policy challenged in the initial liti­
gation.282  This limitation effectively tailors the exception’s applica­
277. See discussion supra notes 74-85. R 
278. Memorandum from Administration of Barack H. Obama on Transfer of De­
tainee to Control of the Attorney General to the Secretary of Defense (Feb. 27, 2009), 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD200900110.pdf. 
279. See discussion infra Part III.C.1-2. 
280. See discussion infra Part III.C.3. 
281. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774 (1978). 
282. Id. 
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tion to plaintiffs who are repeat players, that is, those who are likely 
to encounter the same policy or practice again and again, without 
ever getting an opportunity to secure a final adjudication of its 
legality. 
Cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, are 
thus usually those which become moot because the injury inflicted 
on the plaintiff by the challenged policy is intrinsically of only lim­
ited duration, so that the passage of time itself inevitably abates the 
injury before the litigation is complete. The most common exam­
ples include candidate or contributor challenges to ballot qualifica­
tion or other election rules.283  In these cases, any particular 
election to which the challenged rules apply will be held before a 
suit seeking to enjoin them can be resolved on the merits.  If the 
challenger is likely to participate in the next election, and thus sub­
ject to the rules, again his or her injury is “capable of repetition, yet 
evading review.”284 
The repeat player requirement is as essential to the exception 
as the inherently transitory character of the plaintiff’s injury. For 
example, a challenge to a state’s one year durational residency re­
quirement for divorce was not found incapable of “repetition, yet 
evading review” because of the extreme improbability that the 
same plaintiff would be harmed by the same state’s policy a second 
time.285  By limiting its application only to those moot cases in 
which the same plaintiff faces the prospect of later identical injury 
by the same defendant, each one evading review, the Supreme 
Court has plainly crafted the “capable of repetition, yet evading re­
view” exception to mootness286 to  serve the most widely accepted 
and least controversial justification for judicial review—the grant­
ing of adequate remedies to persons who are unlawfully injured.287 
But Al-Marri’s experience shows that a plaintiff’s injuries need 
not be transitory to be “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” 
Far from it. Al-Marri’s military detention was by its terms indefinite 
when authorized by President Bush and had lasted nearly six years 
when it was lifted, in favor of pre-trial detention attendant to crimi­
283. See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 735-36 (2008). 
284. Id. 
285. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-400 (1975). 
286. Id. 
287. Id. (noting that state officials would “continue to enforce the challenged [di­
vorce] statute . . .  yet . . . no single challenger will remain subject to its restrictions for 
the period necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion”). 
745 
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nal prosecution, by President Obama.288  The harms suffered by Al-
Marri are instead “capable of repetition, yet evading review” be­
cause the actions of both Presidential Administrations show that 
they are willing and able to move him from civilian to military de­
tention and back at any time, for any reason. 
The timing of his transfers—at apparently key moments in his 
first criminal prosecution and again in the litigation challenging the 
legality of his military detention—strongly suggest that in Al­
Marri’s case the Government’s reasons were in each instance 
chiefly strategic.  But Al-Marri’s right to invoke the “capable of 
repetition, yet evading review” exception to a mootness dismissal 
did not depend on an ascription to the executive branch of the per­
haps less than salutary motivation of avoiding judicial review of its 
detention policies.  The point is not the President’s reason for 
changing the terms of Al-Marri’s detention.  Rather, it is his power 
to do so, without limitation, at times and in ways that inflict, then 
re-inflict, the same harm on Al-Marri, over and over. 
Significantly, the Obama Administration’s successful briefs to 
the Supreme Court urging dismissal of Al-Marri’s appeal as moot 
continued to avow the power to remand him again to indefinite de­
tention regardless of the outcome of the criminal proceedings 
against him.289  Candidly, the brief even suggested that his future 
military detention might even be based on “evidence adduced dur­
ing his criminal proceeding.”290  And officially, at least, the Admin­
istration held to the position of its predecessor that criminal 
prosecution and military detention are separate, independent, and 
wholly parallel responses to the threat of terrorism in the aftermath 
of September 11.291  The fact that a person is acquitted of criminal 
charges does not prevent his imprisonment in military custody on 
the basis of the same (alleged) acts that provided the basis for such 
charges.  At the time of the indictment that brought a formal end to 
his military detention, Al-Marri thus faced (and may yet face) at 
least a reasonable expectation that he would (and will) be subjected 
to such detention again.  The Supreme Court should have recog­
nized that this expectation brought his injuries within the “capable 
288. See supra Part II.A. 
289. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 10-12, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct 
1545 (2009) (No. 08-368), 2009 WL 526212. 
290. Id. at 11. 
291. Peter Finn, Administration Won’t Seek New Detention System, Wash. Post, 
Sept. 24, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/23/AR 
2009092304427.html. 
 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE301.txt unknown Seq: 50 30-SEP-11 8:12 
746 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:697 
of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness and, 
therefore, within its primary responsibility to provide remedies for 
such injuries if they are unlawfully inflicted. 
2. Voluntary Cessation 
Unlike the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doc­
trine, the voluntary cessation exception to mootness does not arise 
from either injuries of limited duration or the dilemmas faced by 
repeat litigants.  Instead, it is directed squarely at preventing the 
sort of strategic avoidance of adjudication that the Obama Admin­
istration appears to have pursued in the Al-Marri detention litiga­
tion.  The voluntary cessation exception counsels that a suit that 
becomes moot because the defendant abandons its challenged pol­
icy or practice in the midst of litigation should be dismissed only if 
the abandonment is genuine.292  The measure of genuineness is 
whether there is “no reasonable expectation” that that challenged 
policy or practice will be revived once the pressure of litigation is 
lifted.293  For purposes of voluntary cessation, the plaintiffs need 
not show that they will be re-injured by such a revival. The ques­
tion is instead whether the defendant is “free to return to his old 
ways,” absent final adjudication of the legality of these ways.294 
Because the voluntary cessation exception to mootness applies 
independently of any continuing threat to the plaintiff, the Supreme 
Court has not justified its application as essential to the remedial 
function of adjudication that underlies the “capable of repetition, 
yet evading review” doctrine.  Instead, the Court has explained its 
development of the voluntary cessation doctrine by pointing both 
to the second major rationale for judicial review, “the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”295 and to the 
threat of overreaching government power that undergirded Justice 
Kennedy’s rationale in Boumediene for holding habeas corpus ap­
plicable at Guantanamo Bay. 
The Court’s concerns to safeguard its authority to declare the 
law and to prevent official abuse are reflected in its expansive use 
of the voluntary cessation doctrine to permit review of the legality 
of policies that have been formally repealed, or even replaced by 
new ones.  Notwithstanding such decisive evidence of official repu­
292. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jack­
sonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 676 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
293. Id. at 677. 
294. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953). 
295. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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diation of a challenged policy, the Court has remained suspicious 
that the changes might be mere stratagems, designed to foil judicial 
review, only to be dropped in favor of a return to an unlawful status 
quo ante as soon as the threat has passed.  Even the possibility of 
this kind of official misconduct is enough to keep a challenge to a 
clearly abandoned policy alive if a defendant is formally “free to 
return to his old ways”: 
A controversy may remain to be settled in such circumstances, 
e.g., a dispute over the legality of the challenged practices. . . . 
This, together with a public interest in having the legality of the 
practices settled, militates against a mootness conclusion. . . . The 
courts have rightly refused to grant defendants such a powerful 
weapon against public law enforcement.296 
An opinion for the Court by Justice Thomas underscores the 
Court’s suspicion of amendments to challenged policies if these 
amendments are adopted in the midst of litigation and retain any 
significant resemblance to measures they replace.297  For Justice 
Thomas, such amendments do not represent abandonment of the 
challenged policies, but amount instead to their re-enactment. The 
Court’s failure to review the original (not the new) policies would 
mean that “a defendant could moot a case by repealing the chal­
lenged statute and replacing it with one that differs only in some 
insignificant respect.”298  For Justice Thomas, this was an obviously 
intolerable result. 
This application of the voluntary cessation exception to moot­
ness underscores the Supreme Court’s jealousy to preserve its au­
thority to pass on the legality of the practices of other governmental 
actors, even when such practices are no longer extant, especially 
when that authority is, or might be, threatened by official abuse of 
the litigation process.  In Al-Marri, however, the military detention 
policies at issue were neither dropped nor amended, sincerely or 
insincerely.  Instead, the Obama Administration mooted Al-Marri’s 
suit challenging his military detention by suspending these policies 
as to him and to him alone.  To be sure, Al-Marri has to date been 
the only non-citizen prisoner taken into military custody while re­
siding legally in the United States, arguably rendering his transfer 
from military to Justice Department detention a voluntary cessation 
296. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632 (citations omitted). 
297. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. at 
662. 
298. Id. 
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of a policy applicable to a class of one. The problem with this argu­
ment is that the Administration emphasized that Al-Marri’s trans­
fer did not represent an abandonment of its asserted power to 
detain anyone else, whether similarly situated to Al-Marri or not. 
In fact, the Obama Administration, as pointed out in the previous 
subsection, did not even foreswear the authority again to return Al-
Marri to military custody.299  It is thus impossible to view Al­
Marri’s transfer as denoting genuine abandonment of anything ex­
cept for the Administration’s willingness to defend this claim of au­
thority in the Supreme Court. 
The Administration’s briefs to the Supreme Court essentially 
conceded this point.  They suggested nothing more than that Presi­
dent Obama had ordered a comprehensive review of military de­
tention policies.300  This meant only that if Al-Marri were 
redesignated for military detention in the future, “that redesigna­
tion would occur in a much different structure under different cir­
cumstances.”301  Nowhere did the Administration disclaim the 
power to detain anyone similarly situated to Al-Marri while the pol­
icy review directed by the President proceeded.  Unless the fruits of 
this review, completely conjectural at the time President Obama 
suspended Al-Marri’s military detention, were to completely 
foreswear the authority to detain persons in his situation, it is possi­
ble, if not likely, that they would differ from the present policy only 
in “some insignificant respect[s].”302  And with respect to the cir­
cumstantial evidence that Al-Marri’s transfer amounts to little more 
than strategic evasion of Supreme Court review, the Administration 
argued only that the President’s responsibility to protect the coun­
try foreclosed such a conclusion: “A rule [the voluntary cessation 
exception] designed to prevent manipulation of litigation should 
not be applied to considered action by the President of the United 
States involving uniquely sensitive questions of national security 
and military policy.”303 
299. See Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 6-9, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct 
1545 (2009) (No. 08-368), 2009 WL 526212 (arguing that al-Marri, as petitioner, is re­
ceiving the relief sought (criminal prosecution) while not addressing the question of 
whether detention is authorized under the AUMF and the Constitution). 
300. See generally, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 6-9, Al-Marri, 139 S. Ct 
1545 (No. 08-368). 
301. Id. at 11. 
302. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. at 
662. 
303. Al-Marri, 2009 WL 526212, at *12. 
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In sum, the Administration offered no answer to the argument 
that its mooting of Al-Marri’s appeal fell squarely within the volun­
tary cessation exception.  Instead, it urged only an abstract to ap­
peal the passive virtues, contending that compelling prudential 
concerns militated against judicial interference with Presidential 
judgments about foreign affairs or national security.  But unless the 
Administration meant to suggest that these concerns should always 
preclude such interference, the circumstances of the Al-Marri litiga­
tion far exceeded the outer limit of their application. 
3.	 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Lament: Mootness After 
Certiorari 
Chief Justice Rehnquist offered a third justification for with­
holding a mootness dismissal, one that also applied to Al-Marri’s 
appeal.  This third exception is for cases that become moot only 
after a grant of certiorari review by the Supreme Court.304  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist began his argument for a post-certiorari excep­
tion to mootness by reviewing the mootness doctrine’s firm position 
among the Supreme Court’s prudentially fashioned set of passive 
virtues: 
If it were indeed Article III which—by reason of its require­
ment of a case or controversy for the exercise of federal judicial 
power—underlies the mootness doctrine, the “capable of repeti­
tion, yet evading” review exception . . . would be incomprehensi­
ble. Article III extends the judicial power of the United States 
only to cases and controversies; it does not except from this re­
quirement other lawsuits which are “capable of repetition, yet 
evading review.”  If our mootness doctrine were forced upon us 
by the case or controversy requirement of Article III itself, we 
would have no more power to decide lawsuits which are “moot” 
but which also raise questions which are capable of repetition but 
evading review than we would to decide cases which are “moot” 
but raise no such questions. . . . 
The logical conclusion to be drawn from . . . the historical 
development of the principle of mootness, is that while an unwill­
ingness to decide moot cases may be connected to the case or 
controversy requirement of Article III, it is an attenuated con­
nection that may be overridden when there are strong reasons to 
override it.  The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” ex­
ception is an example.  So too is our refusal to dismiss as moot 
those cases in which the defendant voluntarily ceases, at some 
304. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1998). 
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advanced stage in the appellate proceedings, whatever activity 
prompted the plaintiff to seek an injunction.305 
The Chief Justice then grounded his argument for an additional 
exception for cases becoming moot after a grant of certiorari as 
squarely within the law declaring function of Supreme Court 
review: 
I believe that we should adopt an additional exception to our 
present mootness doctrine for those cases where the events 
which render the case moot have supervened since our grant of 
certiorari . . . in the case. . . . [Our] resources—the time spent 
preparing to decide the case by reading briefs, hearing oral argu­
ments, and conferring—are squandered in every case in which it 
becomes apparent after the decisional process is underway that 
we may not reach the question presented.  To me [that] . . . is a 
sufficient reason either to abandon the doctrine of mootness alto­
gether in cases which this Court has decided to review, or at least 
to relax the doctrine. . . . I would leave the mootness doctrine . . . 
in full force and effect when applied to the earlier stages of a 
lawsuit, but I believe that once this Court has undertaken a con­
sideration of a case, an exception to that principle is just as much 
warranted as where a case is “capable of  repetition, yet evading 
review.”306 
The Supreme Court has never formally adopted Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s recommendation.  But as a case to which both the “ca­
pable of repetition, yet evading” review and the voluntary cessation 
exceptions to mootness also applied, Al-Marri’s appeal presented 
the strongest possible occasion for its application. 
CONCLUSION 
In defending the passive virtues as techniques of judicial re­
straint, Alexander Bickel was not counseling judicial abdication. 
For Bickel, the passive virtues permitted the Supreme Court a mea­
sure of control over the timing of judicial review in order to maxi­
mize its effectiveness when exercised, as it properly and inevitably 
must be.307  By deferring the resolution, especially of issues of great 
moment and substantial controversy, until passions may cool from 
the balm the passage of time sometimes affords, Bickel thought the 
Court would be better able to coerce the elected branches to ad­
305. Id. at 330-31 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
306. Id. at 331-33. 
307. See Bickel, supra note 32, at 57-58. R 
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here to the rule of law and less likely itself to succumb to an expedi­
ent rather than principled declaration of what the law requires.308 
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Supreme Court has 
decided five cases which concern directly, or indirectly, the Presi­
dent’s power to place persons in indefinite military detention with­
out trial and the rights of persons who may be subject to such 
detention.309  Prompted by a commitment to judicial restraint, the 
Court resolved all of these cases on exceedingly narrow grounds. 
As a result, its decisions failed to address many of the central ques­
tions raised by the executive branch’s use of military detention in 
aid of its efforts to combat terrorism.310  The Court has said very 
little about the scope, geographical or temporal, of the military de­
tention power, or about the differences, if any, raised by the appli­
cation of the power to citizens, as opposed to non-citizens, of the 
United States.311  Nor has the Court defined the kinds of activities 
(beyond engaging while a member of the Afghanistan government’s 
military forces in armed conflict against American forces in that 
country) that can properly subject someone to indefinite military 
detention or the constitutionally required procedures, if any, which 
must attend the military detention of non-citizens.312  Finally, the 
Court has not addressed whether the government’s wish to interro­
gate a person can ever, even in part, provide a basis for detaining 
that person. 
Ali Al-Marri was a non-citizen arrested while legally residing 
in the United States when President Bush placed him in military 
detention, in part in order to interrogate him about al-Qaeda.313 
None of Al-Marri’s alleged conduct that provided the basis for the 
President’s decision was as a member of the military forces of Af­
ghanistan, or of any other nation.  Much of the alleged conduct 
took place before September 11, 2001, and some of it apparently 
transpired in the United States.  The full U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit nonetheless sustained the President’s authority 
to hold Al-Marri in military detention, a decision which the Su­
preme Court accepted for review.314 
308. See id. at 77-78. 
309. See supra Part II. 
310. See supra Part II. 
311. See supra Part II. 
312. See supra Part II. 
313. See supra Part II. 
314. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. 
Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009). 
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Disposition of Al-Marri’s case would likely have required the 
Court to address many, perhaps even most, of the significant issues 
it declined to reach in the five previous post-September 11 decisions 
which touched on the President’s military detention power. This 
disposition would also have been rendered in a context significantly 
less charged than the one the Court faced when it decided the ear­
lier cases.  The Presidency of George W. Bush, responsible for the 
adoption of the policies challenged by Al-Marri, had ended.  His 
successor, Barack Obama, publicly opposed many of these policies 
during the last presidential campaign and had announced his inten­
tion to review at least some of them.315  These developments likely 
signaled at least a modest, albeit perhaps short-lived, tempering of 
the political polarization which surrounded military detention dur­
ing the Bush Administration.  At the least, they pointed toward a 
lower risk of serious conflict between the Supreme Court and the 
Executive Branch in the event of a decision which limited presiden­
tial power.  It is even possible that a declaration from the Court as 
to what the law is with respect to any aspect of the President’s mili­
tary detention authority would have been helpful to the policy re­
view directed by President Obama.  And there is no doubt that such 
a declaration would have been enormously useful to the district 
judges who are now sorting out the habeas corpus petitions from 
Guantanamo detainees in the wake of Boumediene.316  In Bickel’s 
terms, the time for a principled judicial resolution of the questions 
presented by Al-Marri’s appeal had arrived. 
Nevertheless, when confronted with the Obama Administra­
tion’s decision to move Al-Marri from military to civilian detention 
in order to prosecute him, the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal 
as moot.317  As an application of the Supreme Court’s mootness 
doctrine, this decision was indefensible.  More important, it funda­
mentally disserved the essential functions of judicial review in our 
constitutional system: to grant relief to persons who are unlawfully 
injured, to say what the law is, and to curb abuse of government 
power. 
315. See Benjamin Wittes & Colleen A. Peppard, Designing Detention: A Model 
Law for Terrorist Incapacitation, BROOKINGS  INSTIT. (June 26, 2009), http://www. 
brookings.edu/papers/2009/0626_detention_wittes.aspx. 
316. See Chisun Lee, Dig Into the Gitmo Detainee Lawsuits, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 
12, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/special/an-examination-of-31-gitmo-detainee­
lawsuits-722#ali_ahmed (chart tracking the lawsuits of the forty-seven Guantanamo 
detainees). 
317. Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. 1545. 
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To be sure, the Court did accompany its dismissal of Al-Marri’s 
appeal with a judgment vacating the decision of the Court of Ap­
peals.318  But that judgment did not deprive that court’s majority 
position sustaining the President’s power to detain Al-Marri of its 
precedential value.  Under the authority of that position, the Presi­
dent remains free plausibly to claim the power similarly to detain 
anyone, citizen or alien, resident of the United States or not, on the 
basis of any unproven conduct, anywhere in the world, that he 
deems to be a military threat to the United States.  President 
Obama’s proposed use of the military detention power may never 
extend this broadly.  But his still pending proposal to institutional­
ize some form of military detention, and his decision to continue 
such detention indefinitely for many of the remaining Guantanamo 
detainees, underscore, however, the likelihood that the power he 
claims will, in Justice Jackson’s dissenting words in the most infa­
mous detention case in our history, lie “about like a loaded weapon 
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausi­
ble claim of an urgent need.”319 
EPILOGUE 
On April 30, 2009, Ali Al-Marri pled guilty to one count of 
conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organi­
zation.320  The maximum prison sentence for this crime is fifteen 
years, and Al-Marri was permitted to argue that a lesser sentence 
should be imposed and that he should receive credit towards com­
pletion of his sentence for his time in military detention.321  The 
Government agreed to dismiss the second count of its indictment of 
Al-Marri, a charge of providing material support to a terrorist or­
ganization.322  Al-Marri also agreed not to oppose his deportation 
to either Qatar or Saudi Arabia upon completion of his prison term, 
while the government agreed that it would not seek again to detain 
318. Id. 
319. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
320. See John Schwartz, Plea Deal Reached with Agent for Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/us/01marri.html. 
321. Lyle Denniston, Lingering Issues for Al-Marri, SCOTUS BLOG (Apr. 30, 
2009, 20:06 EST), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/04/lingering-issues-for-al-marri/. 
322. Id. 
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Al-Marri in military custody on the basis of conduct he engaged in 
before his arrest on December 12, 2001.323 
In the plea agreement, Al-Marri admitted to attending al-
Qaeda camps between 1998 and 2004, meeting with Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, the al-Qaeda official, in 2001, and to offering his ser­
vices to the organization.324  He further admitted communicating 
with and receiving money during the summer of 2001 from Mustafa 
Al-Hawshawi, the al-Qaeda member who is also thought to be a 
primary financier of the September 11 attacks.325  Finally, Al-Marri 
admitted that he conducted research, apparently after his re-entry 
into the United States on September 10, 2001, into various cyanide 
substances, including their prices, toxicity levels, and commercial 
uses, and that an almanac recovered by the government in his 
apartment was bookmarked at pages showing dams, waterways, and 
tunnels in the United States.326 
The plea agreement also indicated Al-Marri’s knowledge of al­
Qaeda’s involvement in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
United States only as of September 21 of that year.327  And though 
Al-Marri admitted to attempting unsuccessfully to make contact 
with al-Qaeda members by telephone during the autumn of 2001, 
the plea agreement indicates no communication between Al-Marri 
and al-Qaeda from September 23rd on.328  In announcing the plea 
agreement, Attorney General Eric Holder said that it “reflects what 
we can achieve when we have faith in our criminal justice system 
and are unwavering in our commitment to the values upon which 
the nation was founded and under the rule of law.”329 
On October 29, 2009, Al-Marri was sentenced to a prison term 
of eight years and four months.330  Federal prosecutors had urged a 
fifteen year sentence, but Judge Michael Mihm decided instead to 
take into account Al-Marri’s eight years in federal custody, includ­
ing the five and one-half years he spent as a military detainee in the 
323. Plea Agreement and Stipulation of Facts at 8-9, United States v. Al-Marri, 
No. 09-CR-10030 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp­
content/uploads/2009/05/plea-agreement-al-marri.pdf. 
324. Id. at 10-11. 
325. Id. at 11-12. 
326. Id. at 16-17. 
327. Id. at 15. 
328. Id. at 15-16. 
329. See Schwartz, supra note 320. R 
330. Carrie Johnson, Judge Credits Time Served in Sentencing Al-Qaeda Aide, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2009/10/29/AR2009102900457.html. 
755 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE301.txt unknown Seq: 59 30-SEP-11 8:12 
2011] NO VIRTUE IN PASSIVITY 
Charleston Navy Brig.331  Given the time he has already served, Al-
Marri will be eligible for release in late 2014.  At the sentencing 
hearing, Al-Marri cried when he told Judge Mihm about not hear­
ing a word from his wife and children during his solitary confine­
ment as a military detainee.332  He also reiterated the admission in 
his guilty plea that he had helped al-Qaeda, adding that he was 
sorry for that and “no longer wished harm to the American 
people.”333 
331. John Schwartz, Admitted Qaeda Agent Receives Prison Sentence, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/us/30marri.html. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. 
